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The value placed on empirical truth in the modem age typically has been considered a 
threat to philosophical inquiry. Beginning with Galileo’s and Newton’s challenge of 
Aristotelian science, which reigned during the Middle Ages, there has been a steady 
increase of scepticism among intellectuals in their aspiration to answer the questions that 
are at the heart of philosophy: (1) What is the essence of human nature? (2) How are 
humans teleologically predisposed towards reality? (3) What is the Final Reality to which 
we all are accountable? In fact, the postmodern mindset of our culture can be defined as 
the hunger, resulting in the many symptoms of intellectual starvation, for an alternative to 
continuing the quest to answer such questions apart from science or writing off such a 
quest as impossible from its inception.
This thesis seeks to demonstrate that findings in neuroscience may answer the first 
question, and that the second question may be answered through an accurate articulation 
of the way we experience ourselves to be intersubjectively related to one another and the 
way we see other animals to be intersubjectively related. In sum, by seeking to trace the 
way we experience the world back to the macro-structures of the human brain, it is argued 
that we are essentially tri-relational agents. Then, using the tri-relational view of human 
nature, an account is provided to explain the manner in which humans come to be 
teleologically concerned with the value of truth.
The tri-relation view of human agency is also used to account for such things as mental 
causation, consciousness, self-control and our ability to identify particulars. But beyond 
this, its explanatory power is used to answer the third question. That is to say, it is argued 
that the tri-relational view of human agency may allow for the possibility of empirically 
confirming the manner in which the Christian tradition speaks of God as a Trinity. The 
thesis concludes on this note, seeking to define the good life for humankind.
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Chapter One
Introduction: Human Agency and the Philosophy of Mind
A. What is a Human Agent?
This question, arguably the primary question of philosophy, has haunted and 
perplexed philosophers through the ages.1 From our modem perspective, the general 
terminology used by the ancients to describe the human subject (e.g., “soul,” “spirit,” 
“mind” and “heart”) seems vague and ambiguous. Although such terms may have given 
many of the ancients a clear enough comprehension of humanity’s nature, for us such 
terminology seems to evoke non-material abstractions that are nebulous. Thus, 
contemporary philosophers who have inherited the problem of describing human 
subjectivity seek to reduce these abstract terms to the concrete, material world (e.g., they 
may contend that the mind is really the brain). Yet, this urge to reduce the human subject 
to more tangible, scientific terms has tended to depersonalize humanity. In embracing 
metaphysical reductionism many philosophers have found a way to explain how the mind 
must be related to the functional, neurochemical networks within the brain, but they have 
failed to account for the subjective character of our conscious (mental) states. Indeed, 
there seems to be no way to account for how there can really be anything like our 
phenomenal experience of subjectivity. As a result, the axiological significance of the 
ancient dictum “know thyself’2 also seems to be lost from sight.
The quest to know oneself is primarily a metaphysical one, but an answer to this 
question must address how this quest also beckons us to become better integrated with 
ourselves, each other and reality at large. The axiological significance of the ancient
1
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dictum asks us to become better oriented to and integrated with the environmental 
demands (both physical and social) placed upon us. Moreover, it assumes that each of us 
plays an active role in orienting ourselves to and integrating ourselves with higher values, 
as we also deliberately pursue the values that attract us at a deeper level, bringing them 
into realization as we conform our character to them. That is to say, it assumes that 
persons—as agents—have their own integrated personalities and a significant amount of 
control over their own conscious states and, therefore, over what values define their 
projective (i.e.,expressive) identity. As a result, to know oneself assumes that we can 
purposively pursue knowing how we are related to our environment, and also that we can 
choose to act in some particular way rather than another. Therefore, whatever 
metaphysical account we give for the question of human agency, this account must 
describe the manner in which we have the power of self-control.
I will present the tri-relational view of human subjectivity, primarily as a solution 
to the problem of human agency, demonstrating how this theory may help us understand 
why human beings naturally value truth, and then investigating how it may resolve a few 
problems in the philosophy of mind. My argument for the theory of the tri-relational 
subject will be transcendental (in the sense that it relies on our indispensable experience of 
human agency), but I will also present some empirical findings that may support the 
theory. Therefore, although the theory will be grounded on our phenomenal experience of 
having certain mental capacities and the characteristic of self-control, it also provides a 
model for neuroscience which can be tested empirically to a large degree, for the theory 
claims that human subjectivity relies ontologically, not only on its physical and social
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environment, but also on the macro-functional structure of the human brain.
There is much phenomenological evidence for human agency and responsibility as 
related to moral concerns, yet many critical thinkers refuse to give credence to such 
evidence because they fail to understand how such a view could be tenably maintained 
from a scientific perspective. Accordingly, to argue for the conclusion that humans are 
animals with the capacity of self-control, and the only animals capable of valuing truth, 
along with the other natural desires for survival and communal concern, I will demonstrate 
how three subsisting relations of human subjectivity (i.e., the attentive-interpretive 
disposition, the pretentive-reflexive disposition and the evaluative synthesis o f the 
responsive-evocative continuum’s personally present awareness) enable us to exist with 
these teleological characteristics. Furthermore, I will investigate how the three relations 
of the tri-relational subject may have some support from the empirical findings of Paul D. 
MacLean’s theory of the triune brain and the macro-functions of the left and right 
hemispheres of the neocortex.
However, it will also be argued that all supraorganic systems acquire and store 
information for the purpose of better satisfying their desires, but not all such systems 
temporally modify their behavior to the same degree. Therefore, before articulating the 
tri-relational view of human agency and arguing how humans come to value truth, I will 
present an account of emergentism which will help us better understand the nature of 
human agency as compared to that of reptiles and non-human mammals. After making 
distinctions among suborganic, organic and supraorganic systems,3 I will argue that— 
unlike unconscious or quasi-conscious (e.g.,reptiles) and conscious or quasi-self-conscious
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(e.g., non-human mammals) supraorganic systems—the three subsisting relations of 
subjectively self-aware supraorganic systems (e.g., humans) are related to each other such 
that their decision-making processes are not only naturally driven to seek coherent 
engagement with their focally relevant, physical and social environments, but are also 
driven to seek for intellectual coherence as they interact with others in a linguistic 
community. In sum, it will be argued that there are three subsisting relations of the human 
subject, and these relations make it possible for toddlers to find themselves subjectively 
self-aware as they interact with other subjects linguistically. Such awareness enables 
children to develop the power of self-control, understood as intellectually responsive 
evaluation and selection of natural and projective satisfaction conditions that are made 
present to us in order to pursue our natural vision of truth and our own expressive, 
projective visions.
Self-control is a contentious issue in philosophy. How can we have control over 
our actions, given the explanatory principle of causal determinism? This principle states 
that every true description of the world’s features will entail (or at least predict) an 
account of how they are causally related to other features of the world. Even if we grant 
the probabilistic perspective, this does nothing to resolve the problem of whether human 
agents are in control of their actions. Ultimately, we must still defeat the skepticism that 
human behavior may be completely determined when we regard it from the natural 
scientific perspective. As John Bishop says, “Skepticism about natural agency is, in fact, 
what underlies the whole skeptical tradition about how free action can occur—both under 
determinism and under indeterminism.”4
As a compatiblist,51 hold that a true account of human agency will not conflict 
with the explanatory principle of causal determinism; however, I would not resist being 
labeled a libertarian, because it is possible for agents to control their own actions, and yet 
have desires with more motivational force than others, or some projective visions that are 
more attractive to them than others. Therefore, my account of emergentism will seek to 
provide a scientifically viable (i.e., granting the epistemological thesis of causal 
determinism) conception of the agency which explains how humans actually do have 
control over their actions through the possibility of making better judgments. To 
accomplish this, I will present a view of emergentism that arises from the importance of 
two questions: (1) What features of the world are causally significant when discussing 
human actions? (2) How is the agent causally related to these features?
B. How has Human Agency been Conceptualized?
One of the most important implications of the predominantly mechanistic view of 
society in the modem era is how our understanding of the human subject has either been 
considered to be a mysterious thing-in-itself or nothing-whatsoever. Thomas Hobbes, of 
course, rejected Descartes’ mind/body distinction, but he also did away with the mind’s 
self-defining capability, making him one of the founders of associationistic psychology, 
which is similar to modem day behaviorism. One of the many examples of the ethical and 
sociological consequence of the Hobbesian view of the subject can be found in the 
emphasis on semiology in modem structural anthropology: “Semiology displaces all issues 
towards the analysis of discourse and gives pride of place to the relationship of emitter to
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code . . . The result is that the origin of meaning can no longer be located . . .  in the author 
of discourse, the individual who believes he is expressing himself, but rather it lies in 
language itself. . . Not man, but structures are decisive! Man is nothingI”6
There is no denying that such a denial of human agency has grave implications for 
our belief in moral obligation. Kant hoped to prevent such determinism by providing an 
alternative to the Hobbesian view of the subject as found in Hume. In place of Hume’s 
conception of the subject as “a mere bundle of perceptions,” Kant posits the unitary “I 
think,” the noumenal self, on the necessity of our phenomenological experience of having 
autonomy and a unitary identity. He introduces a middle path as an alternative to 
Descartes’s mind-substance and Hume’s scepticism of a unitary mind. As Kant said, “. . . 
only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of representations in one consciousness, do I call 
them one and all mine. For otherwise I should have as many-coloured and diverse a self as 
I have representations of which I am conscious to myself.7
Understood in this light, Kant’s ethics rests on his anthropology, which serves as a 
safe-haven of freedom in a mechanistic world. Yet, although Kant provides us with an 
alternative to a mechanistic explanation of man, his view of the subject seems to retain the 
mysterious, solipsistic character of Descartes’s ghost in the machine. Furthermore, from 
Kant’s Transcendental perspective, we can neither argue that we are in fact free, nor can 
we argue that we are completely determined. Rather, it all depends on whether our 
understanding is practically or scientifically oriented; in the former, conscience gives us 
reason to believe we are completely free; in the later, empirical investigation of the brain’s 
relation to the environment gives us reason to believe we are utterly determined.
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Before articulating, and arguing for, the tri-relational view of subjectivity in 
Chapter 3, Chapter 2 will be devoted to understanding how contemporary philosophers 
(who have chosen the scientific orientation, rather than Kant’s practical orientation) have 
conceived of human agency and personhood. I will summarize and criticise Daniel 
Dennett’s narrative conception of the self, comparing it to Derek Parfit’s anti- 
substantialist (and reductionist) position, while articulating some consequences of Hugh 
Mellor’s denial of subjectivity.
These contemporary denials of subjectivity not only fail to provide us a way to 
think about human agency, but they also are unable to resolve problems in the philosophy 
of mind. Consequently, in Chapter 4 1 will demonstrate how the tri-relational view of 
human agency can help us understand the manner in which humans, as subjectively self- 
aware, supraorganic systems, have minds in and through their three subsisting relations; in 
fact, it may enable us to resolve some problematic issues in the philosophy of mind from a 
more holistic perspective.
C. Two Basic Problems in the Philosophy of Mind: Mental Causation and Meaning
Mental causation, the problem of how mental states or properties can interact with 
physical events or properties, still causes many problems for contemporary philosophers. 
For example, functionalism, the reigning paradigm in the philosophy of mind, identifies 
mental states with their dispositional relations. These functional or causal roles are the 
relations mental states bear to environmental effects upon bodies, other functional roles 
(i.e., mental states) and bodily behavior. Yet in reducing mental states to their
dispositional relations, functionalists seem unable to account for how intentional states 
(i.e., perception, belief and emotion, which refer to the world) can have effects in virtue of 
the fact that they refer to the world. As a result, functionalists are unable to account for 
the causal efficacy of intentionality.
This becomes evident in Davidson’s theory of action.® His “anomalous monism” 
avoids all talk about the intentionality of mental states, and instead opts to refer to 
psychological explanations as a species of causal explanation. Kathleen Lennon explains, 
“The causal generalizations required to support the singular causal link between reasons 
and actions . . . rest on the non-intentional characteristics of events. Intentional states 
therefore cause actions in virtue of their neurophysiological characteristics.”9 Thus 
understood, Davidson argues that an agent is caused to perform an action because of her 
desire and her instrumental belief that she can attain her desire. However, such a view 
seems to turn a subject’s mental states into mere theoretical posits, because an account of 
intentionality is left out of the explanation. Normally understood, an agent does not 
perform an action because she has a certain belief and desire; rather, she acts in order to 
satisfy her desire (or what I will call a natural or projective vision). Thus, mental states 
seem to be more teleological than functional.
As I argue for what the tri-relational view of human agency has to offer to 
problems in the philosophy of mind (in Chapter 4), it will be maintained that we cannot 
account for how intentional states are causally efficacious unless we understand how 
human subjectivity is responsively and evocatively related to other things in the world 
through its inherent teleological dispositions. Such an account, I believe, is provided by
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the tri-relational view of human agency, which explains how we have natural teleological 
dispositions towards our environment. Basically, it will be argued that mental states only 
refer to the world and have causal influence because they exist as the result of our natural, 
teleological engagement with the physical and social environments. Furthermore, the 
responsive-evocative continuum of subjectivity, especially its personally present, 
evaluative synthesis, is causally related to these mental states, because all mental states 
only originate as a result of this continuum’s unconscious, conscious or subjectively self- 
aware decision-making processes while being engaged with its environment.
Recently there seems to be much interest in the debate between extemalism, the 
theory that meanings are dependent on our relation to our environment, and intemalism, 
the theory that meanings are only in the mechanism we call the brain or mind.11 Since its 
birth there has been a tendency in analytic philosophy to stress a separation between the 
content of mental states and the content of experience. Yet, many philosophers are 
beginning to challenge the idea that meanings are “realized in” internal mechanisms, such 
as the components of the brain. It is argued that mental states do not merely supervene on 
intrinsic mechanisms, but are partly determined by the relation between the subject and his 
environment.
For other philosophers (e.g., Hubert Dreyfus), extemalism posits that which 
originates most of the problems in the philosophy of mind: an immense gap between an 
isolated subject and his environment, that is, the subject-object distinction. As such, some 
want to avoid all “mentalistic overtones,”11 placing emphasis merely on our practical 
coping, or occupation, with the world. I take such a formulation to be an extreme form of
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extemalism. Richard M. McDonough criticises Dreyfus’ interpretation of Heidegger on 
this very point, saying, “Specifically, one must ask, is one in-a-world by virtue of coping 
with things, or must one already be-in-a-world to cope with things in if? Dreyfus’ 
formulation implies the former. But Heidegger clearly intends the latter.”12
As opposed to intemalism and extreme extemalism, I will defend an externalist 
stance (which I prefer to call relationalism) that views subjectively self-aware agents as 
having the meanings of their mental states dependent upon their past-present reflexive 
identity, their future-present projective identity and a present meta-context of 
intersubjectivity. Although these are dependent upon our social environment, relationalism 
allows us to understand how an individual subject partly determines one’s own narrative 
self, that is, the way that the responsive-evocative continuum’s personally present, 
evaluative synthesis is meaningfully related to a social environment through an intellectual 
re-interpretation of a past-present reflexive identity in order to satisfy a future-present 
projective visions, while also realizing a present, natural vision of truth. In sum, the 
meaning of our minds is there because we are agents who are intellectually engaged in 
maintaining, or failing to maintain, the unity of our own autobiographical memories as we 
dwell in an intersubjective environment. In fact, the tri-relational view of human agency 
seeks to answer why there is an environment in the first place. This account will be 
presented at in Chapter 4, where I will conclude by demonstrating how relationalism may 
allow us to understand how pragmatism, coherence and (something like) correspondence 
theories of truth are inherently interrelated.
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Chapter Two 
The Denial of Human Agency and its Consequences
A. Dennett’s Narrative view of the Self
Daniel Dennett does not want necessarily to deny the existence of different levels 
of reality, but his methodology has severe ontological consequences. He makes the mild 
claim that things will not always turn out to be as real as we thought them to be and is 
thereby pleased to rid us of the annoyingly persistent idea of the self as an entity in the 
brain. In its place, he maintains that the self is a "center of narrative gravity," a useful 
abstraction of what we "feel" our brain doing, that is, building "up a defining story about 
ourselves, organized around a sort of basic blip of self-representation. The blip isn't a self, 
of course; it's a representation of a self."1 This “self-representation,” however, cannot 
rationally control or contribute by positing its own interests and goals; neither can it play 
an active causal role in organizing its own identity. Rather, “what makes a person the 
person he or she is the coalition of memes [i.e., the cultural ‘genes’ of evolution] that 
govern—that play the long term roles in determining which decisions are made along the 
way.”2 Therefore, the self specifies a "real" level of existence—it has a fictional existence 
as the open-ended biography of the living body.
Dennett recognizes three methodological stances that can aid a scientist in 
predicting the behavior of different types of systems. First, one can have the physical 
stance which grants an investigator knowledge of a system relative to that system’s 
physical state and laws. Second, the design stance offers an explanation of a system, but
12
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only relative to a hypothesis that a person holds about the system’s functional design; e.g., 
one may know how to drive a car but not have a clue as to what actually propels the car. 
Lastly, in the intentional stance, the investigator tries “to figure out what the designers 
had in mind.”3 In other words, the intentional stance provides an explanation of the 
hypothesis that a system is behaving rationally relative to its purposes and beliefs. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that these purposes and beliefs “(and some other 
mental items drawn from folk psychology) are like [centers of gravity] in being abstracta 
rather than part of the ‘furniture of the physical world’ and in being attributed in 
statements that are true only if we exempt them from a certain standard of literality.”4
Although Dennett is willing to grant a powerful (“abstract”?) effect to the memes 
infesting our brains, determining the meaning of our lives, he can do so only with the 
brain's impersonal meta-habits of talking to itself. The self can have no influence on these 
"habits of self-stimulating," because they are caused by a pandemonium of dumb 
specialists. For a moment, one specialist is left in charge who controls the brain with its 
particular epistemic hunger. It is not individual persons who desire to know the truth of a 
matter; rather, it is impersonal mechanisms and memes working themselves out to satisfy 
other impersonal mechanisms and memes which lack the proper information. For this 
reason, all his talk about persons as having some ("almost," or "for the most part") sway 
of influence in overall performance of their brains is utter malarkey, for it is only the 
memes themselves that influence the brain's mind.
Those, like Dennett, influenced by the connectionism of modem day cognitive 
science cannot tell us who we are, for merely having systems, even millions of systems,
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that maintain control by keeping our outputs within a restricted range does not account for 
how we are subjects. Our self-conscious mental states do not become conscious, as 
Dennett says, “by winning the competitions against other mental contents for domination 
in the control of behavior. . ,”5 In stripping the self of any causal power and replacing it 
with “abstracta,” Dennett has lost a way of providing us a truly satisfactory explanation of 
how a subject can control its beliefs, desires, intentions, and policies in a detached way, as 
objects of evaluation. He tells us that his Gregorian creatures, with their internal 
environment, test their possible moves before they actually make them, but what are these 
creatures? Are they not just mindless networks of abstracta? Indeed, the self, as he 
understands it, is the result of thousands of “dumb” micro-processes interacting within the 
brain, forming the hard drive of different meta-habits which, in turn, create a complex 
impersonal, syntactic structure that stores memes as they are received. Hence, the content 
of a person's meaning and purpose in life can only come from an "interplay of memes," and 
this interplay thwarts, exploits and redirects "the machinery Mother Nature has given us."6
In sum, his denial that humans actually have self-control in defining their narrative 
selves results in a contradiction of how he speaks about human agents. Although he denies 
that there are an actual entities as human agents, he speaks of the selves as possessing 
“blessings” and “esteem” for certain memes (i.e., the cultural units of evolution). That is, 
his language assumes that we, as agents with self-control, can present ourselves to 
ourselves, yet he does not account for how agents are in possession of themselves.
I believe his account of the self is contradictory because he fails to make a 
distinction between the subject that exists as an individual subject (i.e., an “I”) and the
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narrative self (or autobiographical memory), over which a subject has a significant amount 
of control. If we are to understand human agency, we must, I will argue, make a 
distinction between the subject and the self, or narrative self. While all animals are 
subjects with sentience in some form or another, only humans are subjectively self-aware 
subjects who are capable of maintaining the narrative unity of themselves, that is, of their 
mental life.
We will see how this explains why Dennett affirms while also denies the existence 
of the self; more specifically, we will come to understand why it is that he wrestles against 
the very structure of human language. For example, we do not say that ‘myself, as a 
narrative self, has control over ‘I’, as a subject; rather, we say that ‘I’ has control over 
‘myself. Also, we will see that, although it is true that we do not start life with selves, 
we do start life as individual subjects. While Dennett is right to refer to selves as open- 
ended narratives, influenced and partly constructed by our social interactions, he is wrong 
to think that subjectivity is reducible to this. On the contrary, we will see that human 
subjectivity is a natural continuum of unconscious, conscious and subjectively self-aware 
decision making processes.
B. The Connection between Dennett and Parfit
Like Dennett, Derek Parfit’s view of the self is ultimately impersonal. That is to 
say, a person is not a real individual, but constructed like clubs and committees. 
Furthermore, he concludes from this that “our reasons for acting should become more 
impersonal. Greater impersonality may seem threatening. But it would often be better for
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everyone.”7
For Parfit, the identity of the subject reduces to a transitive relation of continually 
connected memories and character traits. The self is not a substance, entity or unitary 
system but a construction of causally related, non-branching psychological states.8 
Therefore, he thinks we should not be concerned about our future, because our future is 
less strongly related to our present relation of interconnected states. But what is this 
“present relation”?
He tells us that “a person is distinct from his brain and his body, and his 
experiences.” Yet, he also says that “persons are not separately existing entities .. ”9 
As he explains, “Personal identity just involves certain kinds of connectedness and 
continuity, when these hold in a one-one form. These relations are what matter.”10 
Basically, he argues that these “present relations” are the only facts we need to understand 
personal identity. He writes, “On the Non-Reductionist View, personal identity is what 
matters. And it does not just involve physical and psychological continuity. It is a separate 
further fact, which must, in every case, either hold completely, or not at all.”11 In sum, 
Parfit denies that there are natural facts of personal identity (or subjectivity) that can hold 
completely, yet he also wants to affirm the existence of a present relation of psychological 
continuity. As a result he cannot account for how humans are members of a natural kind, 
having their identity fixed by a certain organized structure that sets them apart from other 
forms of existence.
I will later argue that if we each are a present relation12 that is a fact, we each 
must also have future-present projective visions from which we respond and are
motivationally driven, and towards which we can make decisions and maintain self­
constancy as we interact with other persons. Also, these future-present visions rely on 
how we are related to a past-present, reflexive identity, because future-present visions 
only gain significance from a past-present reflexive identity as they are personally 
evaluated through a disposition of temporal abeyance according to how we are presently 
related to a natural, teleological vision of truth. In other words, we must have future- 
present projective visions if we each are to have our own personal identity. Together, the 
three subsisting relations which make up the tri-relational agent, enabling the subject to 
maintains one’s own personally individualized identity over time. Therefore, if our present 
relation to other psychological states is a fact, our personal identity must be concerned 
about future-present visions.
C. Hugh Mellor’s views of Self, Time and Experience
For naturalistic reasons, Hugh Mellor also denies that there are any subjective 
facts or selves. But he goes further than Parfit by unambiguously denying that there is 
anything such as a present relation of identity; in fact, for him, “there are no tensed 
facts.”13 He relies on McTaggart’s argument that time understood as a series of nows 
(past-present-future) involves a contradiction: every member is included in the other so 
that these very predicates contradict each other. If there were an actual now, Mellor 
explains, “then since all sentence tokens of the form ‘The time is now Y’ are true if and 
only if they occur at Y, every time would have to be both now (to make the true tokens 
true) and not now (to make the false ones false), which it can’t be.”14 For Mellor,
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there is no nows that moves from the future through the present and into the past, that is, 
there are not facts involving pastness or futurality. Instead, he believes time to be a series, 
such as that by which we make discoveries in physics (earlier-simultaneous-later). All 
temporal statements are to be explained by this series rather than relying on the indexical 
‘now’, which he takes to be a (notional) semantic function. For him, it is only true that I 
am now writing this sentence because it is simultaneous with this event (i.e., writing a 
sentence).
But what is this event? Does not this event assume that something has happened at 
a particular time, a particular now? Indeed it does, for it refers to some particular event 
that maintains identity over time; in fact, it meaning relies on a lived subject. Indexical 
language in general seems to be essential to human agency. Words like ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’ 
and ‘this’ are not merely descriptive terms. Their meanings are not determined by their 
reference to particular objects in the world, but to the manner in which a subject is actively 
engaged or situated in the world. That is to say, we can identify this event because it has 
constancy in being part of an agent’s projective, metapersonal context that can be referred 
to before the event actually happened, as it was taking place and after it was completed.
In Chapter 4 ,1 will return to the problem of this event, which assumes there is an 
agent who is now writing. Likewise, in the case of the sentence (‘The time is now Y’), it 
must either be uttered or written by an agent at a certain moment which can be true only 
when it was written or spoken. I will argue that this moment of engaged agency is best 
understood as the inclusion of past-present pretentive-reflexive identities into future- 
present projective visions, as the responsive-evocative continuum’s personally present,
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evaluative synthesis decides to complete the action within a meta-context of 
intersubjectivity. Therefore, we will see that the subsisting relations of the tri-relational 
subject are simultaneously interrelated, enabling us to refer to tensed facts such as now or 
this. In fact, it will be shown that Mellor’s preference for the time series of physics 
presupposes the reality of lived subject.
For Mellor, just as nows are mere semantic functions, so are Is and properties of 
being me. So, when Mellor speaks of second-order beliefs (i.e., the act of believing that I 
have a particular belief), he posits an inner sense (i.e., “insight”) to stop the infinite regress 
of believing mental states. He says, “Just as eyesight is how we know about the things we 
see, so insight is how we know about our own present beliefs.”15
Although such “insight” is at best controversial and shrouded in mystery, if we are 
to take him seriously he must also maintain that this impersonal “insight” is also 
responsible for recognising what certain forms of experience are like. By “insight” 
secondary experiences, i.e., images through which experience is known to be like 
something, are not only believed, but believed “correctly, i.e., in a way that makes me 
recognise them when I have them.”16
As a result, Mellor seems to be an extreme internalist, for the content of 
experience is described in a way that does not necessarily require the existence of things in 
an environment spatially outside the thinker. Although highly unlikely, it is possible on 
Mellor’s account, that we are just brains in vats. Accordingly, there seems to be nothing 
that could justify the degree of correctness his belief (i.e., of his secondary experience) has 
to primary experience. Indeed, he tells us that he “can only explain what it is to know what
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some experiences are like by invoking other experiences (secondary experiences) of which 
we lack even that much knowledge.”17 Without the presupposition of “insight,” Mellor is 
unable to understand how we can have knowledge of the world. Therefore, he is unable to 
bridge the gap between secondary experience and the primary experience of the world.
Following McDowell,18 who wants relief from the resulting scepticism of Wilfrid 
Sellar’s “Myth of the Given,” which imposes itself between the subject and the world, I 
will explore what the theory of the tri-relational view of human agency offers in way of 
relief, describing how it supports relationalism, which both offers a way of understanding 
our primary experience and upholds the view that what is given in our prospective 
apprehension of experience can be confirmed within a community of intellectually honest 
agents who share similar practices of engaging reality. That is, I will show how our 
disinterested judgments of reality are intellectually responsive to the facts of the world 
because the content of our mental states is determined by our previous engagements with 
the physical world and within a social environment. Furthermore, I hope to articulate how 
we may know that our primary experience correspond to reality.
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Chapter Three
Emergentism and the Tri-relational View of Human Agency
A. Basic Assumptions for the Tri-relational Subject
Reductionism in the philosophy of mind is motivated by the desire to overcome 
the dualism of a mental substance that is not extended in space (e.g., ideas) and a physical 
substance that is extended in space (e.g., the body). Otherwise, how could we ever 
account for the causal interaction between mental and physical states? But a denial of 
dualism need not imply that we can utterly reduce that which makes mental states mental 
to that which gives the body its characteristics. For example, in the way that chemical 
reactions in organic structures (e.g., amino and nucleic acids) rely on chemical reactions of 
non-organic structures (e.g., carbon, hydrogen and oxygen), and yet have causal relations 
that are not utterly determined by these non-organic structures, so too it may be that 
interactions between mental states and properties depend upon, and yet are not utterly 
determined by, characteristics of physical states and properties.
I will assume, then, that all natural things consist of the same substance (call it 
“matter,” “energy,” etc.). However, I will also assume that this substance is conditioned 
by a macro- structural organization, and can be partly conditioned by how it is related to 
other structural organizations. Such a position presupposes that all natural things are 
causally related with, and influenced by, many other things within a holistic system. 
Therefore, I maintain the basic thesis of naturalism to the extent that it requires that all 
things are related to many other things in law-like relationships. But I also insist that in the 
same way we cannot identify the actual content of substance unless we have a coherent,
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holistic view of reality, I do not suppose that we can specifically identify the actual content 
of mental states apart from some holistic view of an organized system that makes these 
states possible in the first place. Therefore, in Chapter 4 I will seek to explain how the tri- 
relational view of human agency may help us understand consciousness to be the result of 
temporal relationships, although it relies on a substance qualified by spatial relationships.
It can be maintained that I hold to the basic thesis of supervenience, which I 
understand to mean that all mental states are in a dependency relation to spatially 
structured organizations (e.g., physical systems). However, the crucial question of 
supervenience has not to do with the proposition that a particular thing depends upon 
another, but the nature in which a particular thing depends upon another. I want to ask: 
What are the structural characteristics that certain types of mental dispositions are 
dependent upon, and in what way are these dispositions structurally related to each other. 
Although I will later specify how I think consciousness is best generally conceived as a 
temporal phenomenon, I will presently argue that the intentionality of mental states rely on 
the macro-functional structure of the brain as an organism is teleologically engaged with 
its environment. Before accomplishing this, however, I want to stress that any adequate 
view of supervenience must incorporate some view of how physical systems are causally 
related to each other.
Obviously, science must work under the instrumental premise of causal 
determinism to discover how the different levels of reality are functionally related, but it 
certainly is not necessary to assume that lower levels of reality (e.g., neurochemicals) must 
have ontological priority in utterly determining what happens at high levels of reality (e.g.,
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mental states). For example, Valerie Hardcastle says, . . many agree that “species” and 
“gene” cannot be defined in terms of lower level properties or entities because the 
definitions are intimately tied to other properties at the higher level.”1 She explains how 
once, through observation, we define different levels of reality, we can understand how 
properties of a higher level may be causally related to other properties at this level more 
than those at a lower level. She says, “One and the same object—an eye, for example— 
can be and in fact is described differently depending upon what sort of questions are being 
asked. We can talk about the eye in terms of its cognitive function, in terms of its 
anatomy, in terms of its physiology, in terms of its chemistry and so on.”2 
Therefore, she concludes, “Insofar as we can define a higher level property, then that 
property might be causally efficacious.”3
If some form of emergentism is not true, it would seem to imply that our 
definitions of causally efficacious properties at higher levels of reality would have no 
ontological basis. Thus, although it is methodologically appealing that all levels of reality 
be reducible to one base level, such an appeal must be of an instrumental nature, 
encouraging those with seeking minds that there is always more to discover. However, 
emergentism, I believe, should be considered to have more ontological appeal. Granting 
that there is significant continuity among levels of reality, it does not claim that lower 
levels of reality are ontologically sufficient to account for higher levels of reality. In sum, 
the parts that make-up a particular system are not enough to explain the whole. Rather, to 
understand the whole we must look beyond the manner in which this particular system is 
explicitly related to other systems, seeking to discover its intrinsic organization, or
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processes of organization. For example, while some of the basic principles of biology can 
be accounted for by the laws of physics and chemistry, as biological levels become more 
developed, the laws of physics and chemistry—although still having an effect on the 
organization of micro- and macro-biological processes (e.g., molecular biology, natural 
and sexual selection)—fail to have focal patterns o f reciprocal influence on how some 
biological entities are intrinsically related to each other (e.g., as in parental care and play). 
With emergentism it becomes possible to understand how communication between similar 
functional systems (e.g., members of the same species) create feedback relationships which 
establish higher level focal patterns of influence and, therefore, are able to rise above the 
influence of lower level laws.
I believe it necessary to stress a distinction between “focal patterns of reciprocal 
influence” and explicit causality.4 Explicit causality happens in the interaction that takes 
place between systems, or aspects within a system, that superimposes themselves upon 
each other. Reciprocal influence is different from explicit causality in that it happens 
through the integration of two or more systems, or aspects within a system, that 
reciprocally and intrinsically rely on the influence of one another for an integrated and 
explicit causal process at a higher ontological level. Therefore, the view of emergentism I 
am proposing recognises at least three distinct, structurally organized physical systems: 
suborganic, organic and supraorganic. By suborganic systems I mean non-living systems, 
which tend to remain closed to reciprocal influence unless put under stress from explicit 
causal relations. Organic systems are living systems or processes that are involved 
reciprocally in continuously open relationships to some other organisms or organic
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processes. And supraorganic systems, which arise within living organisms, are involved in 
decision-making processes, and some are even involved in determining the manner in 
which they experience their focal patterns of reciprocal influence. Understood in this way, 
while suborganic systems need to be prompted into reciprocal influence, organic systems 
are continually open to reciprocal influence with other organic systems. But supraorganic 
systems are not only open to reciprocal influence, they are involved in decision-making 
processed which enable them partly to experience (the extent to which depends upon the 
development of their decision-making processes) their focal patterns of reciprocal relations 
with other systems.
In Chapter 4 I will briefly discuss how the extent to which supraorganic systems 
experience their environment depends on the temporal levels of concentration to which 
decision-making processes make information focally present, but the main concern of this 
present Chapter will be to demonstrate how subjectively self-aware supraorganic systems 
(i.e., humans) have decision-making processes that enable them partly to define their own 
focal patterns of reciprocation. However, I will also argue that such systems only have 
this ability because they are more significantly determined by focal patterns of reciprocal 
influence of other subjectively self-aware supraorganic systems through their linguistic 
capacity. But before doing this, I will provide some examples for my distinction between 
suborganic, organic and supraorganic systems.
As the universe unfolds, it is evident that as systems move to higher levels of 
reality they also become more reciprocal in character. For example, the reciprocal 
relations of suborganic systems tend to be dependent upon external, explicit causal
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relations. For example, atoms are maintained and held together by internal forces and 
therefore more or less tend to be closed systems, meaning that they, in an undisturbed 
state, “do not exchange energies with their environment, although they are affected by 
high energies and heat.”5 Indeed, atoms with complete outer shells (i.e., such as helium 
atoms) almost never interact with other atoms. However, atoms can become unstable, and 
therefore are open to reciprocal interaction with other atoms, under stressful conditions 
(e.g., due to an imbalance between the electrons in their outer shell and the protons in 
their nucleus or because they fall under electron bombardment) and thereby absorb energy 
from outside themselves.
I am not saying that subatomic particles (e.g., electrons and protons) are not 
involved in reciprocal relationships with other particles, but that ordinarily these particles
are in balance within the atom. As a result, there must be some external, explicit force
which separates an atom’s positive and negative charges before there is the potential for
something like a reciprocal flow of electricity. Also, although molecules are integrated
collections of atoms that have bonded together through their electrons, they also tend to
remain closed systems. Without some superimposing force (e.g. heat) many molecules will
not chemically interact with other molecules.
Unlike suborganic systems, while organic systems exist they are continually 
maintained as open systems of reciprocal influence, constantly integrated with their 
environment as they replicate, exchange and store energies and information with other 
interrelated, organic systems. All organisms are interrelated to and interdependent upon 
other living systems, even individual cells are greatly influenced by the activity, and the
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products of activity, of other cells in tissue, organ, organ-system and organism. Such 
reciprocal relationships are especially evident in the original formation of amino acid 
chains, forming protein chains, with the aid of nucleic acids (DNA and RNA): “We know 
that cells link amino acids together into proteins based on instructions carried by DNA 
(and RNA), and that cells can synthesize DNA and RNA with the aid of enzymes (which 
are proteins).”6 It seems to be the case that DNA and RNA are as reciprocally and 
intrinsically depend upon proteins as these very proteins chains are reciprocally and 
intrinsically depended upon DNA and RNA.
However, as organic systems are reciprocally interrelated (in a constant process of 
intake and output to replenish themselves), they do manifest varying degrees in which they 
can superimpose themselves upon other systems through explicit causal relationships, 
outside of their focal patterns of reciprocal influence with other systems. For example, 
moving organisms can impose explicit effects on a number of different types of entities 
over a large span of territory, whereas organic cells only have a localized, explicit effects 
on other organic processes in their (largely) stationary setting. The physical identities of 
moving organisms are not disturbed because of decision-making processes which regulate 
and intensify their own internal environments, enabling organisms to resist the vicissitudes 
of features changing in their external environments. While many organic systems (e.g., 
cells) tend to be lost in a sea of tacit, non-expressive, reciprocal influence, supraorganic 
systems (i.e., organisms with some form of decision-making processes) can maintain their 
physical individuality, while being in explicit causal relations with a changing environment.
Although lower level supraorganisms maintain their individuality on the basis of
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biological homeostasis through reciprocal, decision-making processes, these feedback 
mechanisms are unable to maintain a cognitive identity by being involved in the subjective 
self-aware formation of their own focal patterns of reciprocal influence. Such systems 
may be instinctively responsive to certain behavioral displays of other supraorganisms (as 
in reptiles) or sympathetically responsive to the feelings of other supraorganisms through 
behavioral stimulus generalizations (as in mammals). But their individuality continues to 
be primarily determined by their biological homeostasis, while their decision-making 
processes merely function to condition and maintain communicative focal patterns of 
reciprocal influence with other mammals. As thermostats regulate the temperature of 
homes after being programed with a sensitivity to a certain outcome (i.e., maintaining a 
comfortable temperature), so, too, are these organisms’ decision-making processes 
regulate their behavior as they are “programmed” by their social interactions.
What seems to be phenomenologically evident is that as supraorganic systems 
become more developed, they are endowed with more concentrated, internal activity in 
their substrates of subjectivity. We witness sub-personal supraorganic systems in such 
creatures as reptiles. Reptiles, which seem to be closer to something like pure stimulus- 
response systems, have a largely unconscious or quasi-conscious responsive continuum of 
motivational attitudes towards their environment. But we also witness pre-personal 
supraorganic systems in non-human mammals, which have a largely conscious or quasi­
self-conscious responsive-evocative continuum of motivational attitudes towards their 
environment. Lastly, we witness personal supraorganic system in ourselves, having a 
subjectively self-aware continuum of motivational attitudes and personality-character traits
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not only towards the environment, but also towards ourselves as individuals with personal 
identities. That is to say, as adults we can condition ourselves knowingly with certain 
personal and character traits—with certain focal patterns that determines the way in which 
we think of ourselves and reciprocally relate with others.
By investigating the functional structural of the human brain, we can begin to see 
why these supraorganic systems have these qualities. While I will seek to better define the 
intentionality of consciousness in Chapter 4, it will now be argue that there are three forms 
of intentionality which make up the subjectively self-aware supraorganic system, and each 
is related to one of the parts of the macro-functional structures of the human brain, as an 
organism is teleologically engaged with and within its social environment.
B. Emergentism and the Triune Brain
Paul D. MacLean’s constructive-discovery (i.e., as of yet not proved) of the triune 
human brain has made it possible to narrow the neurochemical complexity of the human 
brain down to its fundamental components. Although the brain consists of billions of 
neurons, millions of neural networks, and hundreds (?) of structural-interacting systems of 
neural networks all communicating with one another, within this buzz of complexity, there 
are three basic components that clearly stand out as defining the overall macro-structure 
of the human brain: the R-complex, the limbic system, and the neocortex. These systems, 
each with its own forms of decision-making processes, build on each other, enabling the 
us to interact with our world in more expressive ways than reptiles and non-human 
mammals.
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Each of these components reveals how the human nervous system developed 
through time. The R-complex (including, e.g., the basal ganglia, the thalamus, and the 
hypothalamus at the top portion of the spinal cord) is involved in unconscious processes 
such as in the regulation of metabolism, digestion and respiration, along with the tacit 
“regulation of daily master routines and subroutines.”7 The limbic system (including, e.g., 
the hippocampus, the septum, the amygdala, and the cingulate gyrus) adds a pre-explicit, 
experiential and emotional dimension to the R-complex’s functions in the primitive 
mammalian brain. Also, with an enlarged cortex, the limbic systems grants some higher 
mammals the power of short-term, working memories along with greater memory 
retention and comparison than more primitive mammals. Finally, with the introduction of 
the neocortex (including the occipital, parietal, temporal, and frontal lobes and prefrontal 
cortices), which enhances, re-organizes and incorporates the old mammalian brain’s 
capacity of pre-verbal memory, motor, sensory and emotional functions into high-level 
linguistic-cognitive functions, humans are gifted with many cognitive talents which other 
mammals lack. In sum, as MacLean says, “Radically different in chemistry and structure 
and in an evolutionary sense countless generations apart, the three neural assemblies 
constitute a hierarchy of three brains-in-one, a triune brain.”8
What is not only ontologically, but also ethically and politically, significant about 
these three different components of the human nervous system does not directly have to 
do with their complex neurochemical functions, but rather with how these functional 
components partly determine how we are intersubjectively related to other subjects 9 In 
other words, each of these three subsystems interiorises aspects of its social environment
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in unique ways, producing a responsive-evocative continuum subjectivity build upon 
intersubjective interactions. Before seeing why the responsive continuum of motivational 
attitudes in reptiles and the responsive-evocative continuum motivational attitudes and 
feeling states in mammals are different from those in humans, I will demonstrate how the 
responsive-evocative continuum of subjectivity of the tri-relational subject is related to the 
triune brain.
The tacit, or procedural, behavioral-responsive relation, including, e.g., needs, 
instincts, desires and behavioral habits and skills, emerges on account of the interiorisation 
of our engagements with an environment through the functional structures of the R- 
complex. I will label this as the responsive relation of the continuum of subjectivity. By 
adding an evocative relation to this continuum, I mean a experiential-integrative relation, 
including, e.g., feelings (emotions and concerns) and pre-explicit episodic memories, that 
emerges on account of the interiorisation of our engagement with an environment through 
the functional structures of the limbic system. Finally, the human mind, which includes 
extrapersonal and metapersonal forms of background awareness, an attentive-interpretive 
disposition and an pretentive-reflexive disposition, will be described as resting upon the 
responsive-evocative continuum of motivational states, personality-character traits and the 
temporal abeyance of a personally present, evaluative synthesis of a past-present identity, 
or subcontext, and a future-present projective vision, or context, according to an 
intersubjective meta-context of other points of views: In this present section I will focus 
on how the content of the mind emerges through the interiorisation of our engagements 
with an environment by the functional structures of the neocortex and the linguistic-
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projective constructions found in society, and in the next section I will discuss the manner 
in which we come to be able to partly interiorise the content of the mind through our 
linguistic capacity.
The responsive-evocative continuum of the tri-relational subject can be thought of 
as consisting of three interiorised forms of intentionality. While functional structures of the 
R-complex enable us to have a corporeal intentionality towards the world, the functional 
structures of the limbic system enable us to have an emotional intentionality towards a 
communal environment. On top of this, the functional structures of the neocortex, in 
operation with the other functional structures of the R-complex and limbic system, grant 
us a linguistic intentionality towards other persons, which plays the key role in the 
development of different cultures.
This distribution is determined by the functions of each subsystem’s structural- 
interacting systems of neural networks. For example, the R-complex is the most 
determined as corporeal intentionality because one of its structural-interacting systems 
(the hypothalamus) is the command center of the neuroendocrine system. The 
hypothalamus is a structural interacting system that functions to mediate the process which 
connects the brain with the entire body by regulating the endocrine system (i.e., the 
autonomic nervous system) and the limbic system10 through a feedback loop whereby it 
“pumps” hormones into the bloodstream, through the pineal gland, to make the body more 
active (through the sympathetic nervous system) or restful (through the parasympathetic 
nervous system). The R-complex also includes the thalamus and the basal ganglia, which 
both serve to regulate and integrate sensations, movement and bodily behavior.11
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As we continue I will discuss some of the components that make-up the other 
forms of intentionality, but for now I will assume that my reader has some understanding 
of how the tri-relational subject is thoroughly embodied.12 After briefly examining how 
the functional structures of the R-complex and limbic system are communicatively 
engaged in reptiles and primitive mammals, I will then investigate how linguistic 
intentionality of human subjects is partly determined by the functional structure of the 
neocortex and the linguistic-projective construction found in culture.
If any one of the functional structures of the human brain manifests characteristics 
that are most amenable to something like the findings of social behaviorism, it is the 
responsive relation of the R-complex. MacLean has studied this component of the brain in 
various kinds of lizards and mammals, concluding that the R-complex plays a basic role in 
behavioral displays used in social communication. Such displays he calls “protosemantic 
communication” (e.g., the nonverbal signaling of dominance, submission and the defense 
of territory) and “interoperative behavior” (e.g., the rigid neural mechanics of routinizing 
which “not only regulate the order in which . . . actions occur, but also the time of their 
occurrence”13). These instinctive, nonverbal (or tacit) forms of behavior include imitating 
the action of other animals, responding positively or negatively to other animals’ signaling, 
and reenacting behavior for the purpose of preserving survival and regeneration.
As linked to a social environment, the R-complex of reptiles and animals has them 
actively engaged in nonverbal communication, providing them with a behavioral memory 
of acquired signaling skills forming a background of predisposed engagement. However, it 
is important to note that not all creatures are behaviorally predisposed merely for the rigid
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purpose of survival, because as the limbic system develops, other relational goals gain 
significance. In other words, different focal patterns o f reciprocal influence begin to re­
orient lower ontological levels (e.g., the R-complex). For example, reptiles can take part 
in grooming, breeding and migratory behavior, but not behavior displaying parental care; 
such behavior, as MacLean says, “is nonexistent in the case of most reptiles, and this may 
have been true of the mammal-like reptiles.”14 He understands three major behavior 
developments happening in the transition from reptiles to mammals: “1) nursing in 
conjunction with maternal care, 2) audiovocal communication for maintaining matemal- 
offspring contact, and 3) play.”15
While reptiles have a corporeal intentionality that enables them to dwell in the 
demands of their social environments by instinctively responding to the behavioral 
dispositions of other reptiles, non-human mammals have an emotional intentionality that 
enables them to dwell in the demands of their social environment by responding to the 
feelingly sympathetic, behavioral dispositions in other mammals. Their primordial, 
corporeal intentionality—the tacit needs, instincts, desires and behavioral habits and skills 
of the R-complex—becomes conditioned (or qualified) by the feelings and pre-explicit, 
episodic memories of its interactions with other mammals. Their bodies are now capable 
of exhibiting emotional expression in the form of play and parental concern. From the 
perspective of neuroscience, because the hypothalamus and basal ganglia of the R- 
complex are neurochemically connected and interrelated to the limbic system, mammals 
have a lower ontological level of being behaviorally responsive to an environment that 
serves as a basis upon which they can be oriented to a higher ontological level of being
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emotionally engaged with their environment. Whereas reptiles are only collectively and 
behaviorally intersubjective, mammals are communally and feelingly intersubjective 
through their behavior. The evocative relation of the limbic system’s functional structures 
gives mammals a certain spiritedness about them which reptiles lack; in fact, it is a 
spiritedness that manifests itself in a high degree of variation among members of a single 
species.
While reptiles have an R-complex, they lack a sufficiently formed limbic system; 
therefore, they are responsively related with other reptiles for the general value of survival. 
Non-humans mammals, because they have a sufficiently formed limbic system and partly 
developed neocortex, have an augmented manner in which they are responsively related 
with other members of their species. They are feelingly responsive to other like 
themselves. In other words, while reptiles are more determined by their need for survival 
through a corporeal intentionality, non-human mammals are capable of desiring the 
pleasure of communal (not merely collective) survival through an emotional intentionality.
If reptiles are responsively related to one another for the purpose of survival, and if 
non-human mammals are responsively and feelingly related to one another in order to 
achieve communal survival, what about humans—what does the functional structure of 
their brain enable them to desire? It will later be argued that the cognitive structure of the 
neocortex and the linguistic character of human communication, enables humans to 
augment how they are feelingly related to other humans with intersubjective desire for 
truth. But for now I will investigate whether the neocortex of the human brain actually 
provides the functional structure for this capacity.
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As compared to humans, even higher mammals are greatly limited in the 
motivations they can provoke within themselves, because their range of motivationally 
strengthened, anticipatory expression is, by and large, limited to the evocative relation of 
the limbic system’s functional structures. All mammals have the ability to arouse or relax 
(through the amygdala and septum, respectively16) the incoming and outgoing information 
of declarative and procedural memories (through the hippocampus), because the 
emotionally sensitive neurons in the limbic systems of mammals are intrinsically connected 
to the preffontal cortex, enabling them to have an anticipatory stance toward a social 
environment.17 As feelings are evoked by the behavioral dispositions of the R-complex 
through the limbic system, the preffontal cortex can be understood as allowing subjects to 
better orient and augment the R-complex’s instinctual and learned behavior, needs and 
drives with their own immediate experiences of pre-verbal communication through the felt 
needs (i.e., concerns) and pre-explicit memories of their engagement within their social 
environment. Therefore, primitive mammalian expressions often seem completely oriented 
to an environment according to a survival instinct, largely dependent on a stimulus in the 
immediate environment. However, in familial and playful interactions they seem to let their 
feelings gracefully rise above the rigid survival oriented expressions of the R-complex to 
condition their behavioral dispositions, both emotionally and concemfully.
With the development of the neocortex in humans there is an enhancement of our 
ability to orient ourselves to immediate social and material environments. This is due to 
the augmentation of the power to control the cognitive operations provided by the 
functional structures of the preffontal cortex: the powers of anticipation, expectation,
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selection, focusing attention and monitoring effects in the environment.18 When we 
compare the power of our intellect and the versatility of our expressive behavior with that 
of other mammals, it is no wonder that the frontal lobes exhibit one of the greatest 
allometric developments in the evolution of the human nervous system, making up 33% of 
the neocortex.19
Before providing some evidence that the neocortex, and especially the enlarged 
frontal and preffontal cortices, provide the functional structures for a linguistic 
intentionality that enables us to condition the responsive-evocative continuum through the 
attentive-interpretive, pretentive-reflexive dispositions and the evaluative synthesis of 
personally present awareness. I need to mention briefly how humans are linguistically 
embedded in society. Indeed, if non-human mammals integrate and express themselves 
most beautifully in their play and family concern, then humans integrate and express 
themselves most beautifully as personal and cultural groomers of meaning through their 
linguistic capacity.
Given the linguistic nature of the meaning structures in culture, we not only dwell 
in the demands of an immediate social environment, we also dwell in the accumulated 
linguistic-projective constructs (e.g., something like Dawkin’s “memes”) which are part of 
the history of human culture (e.g., the surviving linguistic-projective constructs of 
deceased humans). Furthermore, because language is the medium whereby humans create 
and recreate culture, these linguistic structures transmit knowledge from one generation to 
the next. Accordingly, a culturally matured person with a healthy brain is thoroughly 
conditioned by linguistic focal patterns of reciprocal influence, and such an individual can
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condition himself with these linguistic constructs with his own focal pattern of personal 
interest.
As in reptiles and non-human mammals, the responsive relation of our responsive- 
evocative continuum of subjectivity grounds our corporeal intentionality in the 
sympathetic behavioral dispositions of other humans within society; but now they do so in 
a more complex fashion. Humans corporeally and sympathetically respond to other people 
and meaning structures through their interiorised linguistic-projective generalizations.20 
While spiders spin webs to catch their food and bears scratch trees to mark their territory, 
adult humans have learned to operate within a complex system of linguistically determined 
social roles and norms so that they may go to work to earn a living, and hope to achieve 
personal goals.
But the linguistic-projective constructs of culture also envelop us with latently 
linguistic-behavioral demands. We cannot get up from our bed in the morning without 
finding ourselves predisposed towards responding to the anticipations and expectations of 
others. For example, behavioral anticipations and expectations are laced in the technology 
which surrounds us, whether in the form of an alarm clock, a toothbrush, or a backpack. 
How is it, then, that these linguistic-behavioral demands can be embodied in the tri- 
relational subject? Beyond this, if we are always and already directed by the linguistic- 
projections of others, how is it possible that we form our own linguistic patterns of 
reciprocal influence from our personal interests? Indeed, how can there be personal 
interests? Before answering these important questions I will seek to articulate how the 
neocortex is functionally related to the responsive-evocative continuum of subjectivity.
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Although the following claims will need direct confirmation, more direct than 
merely citing references, through the empirical research of neuroscientists, I will seek to 
provide some evidence that the neocortex provides the functional structures for two of the 
subsisting relations that allow our responsive-evocative continuum of subjectivity to have 
a personal (rational) linguistic capacity. On the one hand, the functional structures of the 
preffontal and ventromedial preffontal cortex of the left hemisphere grants a subject 
interpretive control over a metapersonal, attentive stance. I will describe this attentive 
stance (or relation) more fully later, but for now it is sufficient to say that it is a disposition 
that allows us to be focally and metapersonally related to objects, events, persons. On the 
other hand, the functional structures of the preffontal and the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex of the right hemisphere allows a subject to have reflexive control over a 
extrapersonal, pretentive stance. This pretentive stance (or relation) will also be discussed 
more fully later, but for I will define it as a disposition that spontaneously responds to the 
attentive-interpretive focusing, while it arouses the responsive-evocative continuum with 
extrapersonal feelings and episodic memories that are relevant to the attentive-interpretive 
disposition’s focally and metapersonally attuned apprehension.
Additionally, in relation to both the pretentive-reflexive and attentive-interpretive 
dispositions, the functional structures of the R-complex, the limbic system and the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex combine to form a hierarchy of decision-making processes, 
culminating in the responsive-evocative continuum’s subjective self-awareness. This 
continuum is more firmly conditioned through the functional structures of the R-complex 
at the center of the brain and less firmly conditioned (and thus more flexible and creative)
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through the functional structures of the limbic system and ventromedial preffontal cortex 
at the front of the brain. The responsive-evocative continuum of motivational attitudes, 
personality-character traits and the evaluative synthesis of personally present awareness 
will later be shown to have some control over the focus of the attentive-interpretive 
stance, according to a natural vision for truth, that which is common to all humans, and 
projective visions, that which allows each of us to be personally individuated. But I will 
begin my investigation by presenting some evidence for the attentive-interpretive 
disposition, which relies on the functional structures of the left hemisphere, and the 
pretentive-reflexive disposition, which relies on the functional structures of the right 
hemisphere.
Many of the functions of the right and left hemisphere are now well documented:21 
The right hemisphere, on the one hand, helps to enable persons to be receptively sensitive 
to gestalt phenomena and excel at visual-motor tasks—while it also empowers persons to 
be acutely sensitive to emotional information. The left hemisphere, on the other hand, 
grants persons the ability to structure linguistically and interpret experiential information, 
control speech production, and draw inferences from a differentiation and analysis of 
experience—while it does not invest persons with the ability to be receptively sensitive to 
emotional change. For these reasons, among others, we know the left hemisphere to be 
more dominant than the right hemisphere in our production of speech. However, some 
asymmetries are still very ambiguous. For example, the right hemisphere is capable of 
acquiring many linguistic capacities and, oddly, even though the right hemisphere is 
attuned to emotions, unlike the left hemisphere, it does not allow agents to initiate
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voluntary facial expressions—although it does empower agents to manifest spontaneous 
laughter.22 It is also a mystery as to why the left hemisphere is involved in the production 
of “false memories,” whereas the right hemisphere is always involved in the production of 
“truthful” memories.23
Although this is not the place to provide as detailed an account as I would like, I 
believe the attribution of a metapersonal, attentive-interpretive disposition to the left 
hemisphere and an extrapersonal, pretentive-reflexive disposition to the right hemisphere 
may help clarify some of these ambiguities. I will consider evidence for the following 
statements: The parietal lobes of the neocortex function together to augment the tacit, 
behavioral-responsive dispositions of the responsive-evocative continuum by developing 
two different forms of spatial orientation. The corporeal intentionality of the responsive- 
evocative continuum is qualified by an abstract-structural orientation by the functional 
structure of the left parietal lobe and an embedded-holistic orientation by the functional 
structure of the right parietal lobe. These spatial orientations qualify corporeal 
intentionality with two different forms of stimulus generalizations that help to condition 
the background perceptual fields that rely on the functional structures of the superior 
temporal lobes. In sum, I will show how there is some evidence to think that the corporeal 
intentionality of the responsive-evocative continuum is tacitly stimulated by metapersonal 
aspects of our perceptual field, granted by the functional structure of the left parietal 
lobe’s abstract-structural orientation. Together with this I will give some evidence for 
how the corporeal intentionality of the responsive-evocative continuum is also tacitly 
stimulated by extrapersonal aspects of our perceptual field, granted by the functional
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structure of the right parietal lobe’s embedded-holist orientation.
The functional structures of the temporal lobes of the neocortex function to 
condition each hemisphere with two different, yet complementary, forms of peripheral, 
background awareness—that is, two pre-reflexive forms of awareness that complementary 
condition our sense information as a perceptual field. The emotional intentionality of the 
responsive-evocative continuum of subjectivity is channeled to the left superior temporal 
lobe, and this conditions the left frontal lobe with a peripherally metapersonal, 
background awareness, e.g., cognitive feelings of experiential-linguistic memories with 
which we cannot personally identify, accompanied by such cognitive concerns as curiosity, 
ambiguity, puzzlement, anxiety, respect and reverential awe. Also, the emotional 
intentionality of the responsive-evocative continuum of subjectivity is channeled to the 
right superior temporal lobe, and this conditions the right frontal lobe with a peripherally 
extrapersonal, background awareness, e.g., cognitive feelings of what other people 
anticipate from us and experiential-linguistic memories with which we can personally 
identify, accompanied by a the full array of intersubjective and subjective emotions and 
concerns. These pre-reflective, background forms of awareness come forth from the 
responsive-evocative continuum, and in the process emotionally and memorially qualify 
the abstract-structural and embedded-holistic conditioned corporeal intentionality of the 
parietal lobes, which will later be shown to be focally conditioned by linguistic 
intentionality of the frontal and prefrontal cortices.
The somatosensory areas of the parietal lobes lie directly behind the motor strips of 
the frontal cortex. Considering that the motor strips are functionally involved in voluntary
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bodily movement and contributors to spontaneous bodily movement, it makes sense to 
think that these strips are intimately connected to the neuronal activity of the 
somatosensory areas, which are “responsible for both the external senses of touch, 
temperature, pain, and the internal senses of joint position, visceral state, and pain.”24 
Furthermore, there is evidence that subcortical components of the brain are active in 
integrating sensorimotor co-ordination. For example, “. . . it has been shown that cells in 
the basal ganglia which receive highly processed spatial information, probably from the 
parietal lobes, are active when [an] animal is tracking a moving visual object.”25 Because 
sensory information is neurologically integrated by the components of the R-complex, it 
makes sense to think our sensory information is conditioned by corporeal intentionality. 
Understood in this way, sensory information has relevance to the spatial, somatic 
character of the parietal and frontal lobes. Furthermore, as corporeal intentionality 
qualifies our sensory information by making it into perceptually relevant information, it 
can then be further qualified by our emotional and linguistic intentionality.
It is well known that the left parietal cortex is endowed with calculative and 
linguistic associative dispositions,26 and is also involved in the integration of somatic and 
visual information. Yet, from the perspective of the tri-relational subject what is more 
significant about these dispositions is where they are located: the left somatosensory area 
interacts with its neighboring temporal lobe and the motor strip of the frontal lobe to pass 
information on to Broca’s area in the left frontal cortex, which controls and coordinates 
muscles to produce speech. Furthermore, the angular gyrus of the parietal lobe is found 
within the left somatosensory area, which is the main area for associating visual images
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with the left temporal lobe’s auditory memories (in the auditory cortex) and linguistic 
comprehension (in Wernicke’s area). Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the left 
somatosensory area can be thought of as conditioning corporeal intentionality with an 
abstract-structural orientation.
We often find ourselves working from this orientation in our daily lives as we 
tacitly respond to common, algorithmic-linguistic constructs. For example, when driving 
we often find ourselves systematically obeying the rules of the road, even when our minds 
are not consciously focusing on these rules. I will later demonstrate how these forms of 
intentionality are also more personally qualified by the attentive-interpretive stance of the 
functional structure of the left frontal lobe, but for now it is important to show how the 
emotional intentionality of the responsive-evocative continuum of subjectivity is also 
tacitly conditioned by the functional structures of the left temporal lobe.
It has been found that patients with an excited left temporal lobe “tend to be 
obsessional, humorless, very concerned with religious ideas, and to have little interest in 
sex . . . “27 Stated differently, an excited left temporal lobe gives a manifest awareness of 
what is normally a background awareness that tacitly focuses on metapersonal concerns, 
e.g., curiosity, puzzlement respect and reverential awe. In addition, there is strong 
evidence that damage to the deeper parts of the temporal lobes, which are closer to the 
limbic system, “shows a sparing of immediate but not lasting memory function . . .”28 In 
support of this, it has also been demonstrated that the outer cortex of the left temporal 
lobe is partly responsible for our capacity of short-term procedural and declarative 
memories.
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The left temporal lobe is generally known to be crucial for speech perception, but 
from the perspective of the tri-relational subject it is also significant that the temporal 
lobes are connected to the hypothalamus (and thus the responsive relational of the 
continuum of subjectivity) through the limbic system.29 Memorial and emotional 
information is evoked from the responsive-evocative continuum through the hippocampus 
and parahippocampus into the temporal lobe’s short-term, working memories, granting it a 
peripherally metapersonal, background adjustment to the body’s current environment. In 
other words, as the responsive-evocative continuum of emotional intentionality moves out 
toward the cortical surface of the brain through the temporal lobes, it can qualify the 
corporeal intentionality of the left parietal lobe, which has already been qualified by 
abstract-structural orientation. More specifically, the functional structures of the left 
temporal lobe condition the corporeal intentionality of the left parietal lobe as it filters the 
extrapersonally relevant force of emotional intentionality, leaving this intentionality with 
only a metapersonally relevant force in its qualification of corporeal intentionality.
While the left parietal lobe grants an abstract-structural orientation to the 
responsive-evocative continuum of subjectivity, the functional structure of the left 
temporal lobe grants it a peripherally metapersonal, background awareness. I will now 
show that there is also some evidence which demonstrates that the corporeal intentionality 
of the responsive-evocative continuum of subjectivity is tacitly conditioned with an 
embedded-holistic orientation through the functional structures of the right parietal lobe, 
while emotional intentionality is conditioned as a peripherally extrapersonal, background 
awareness through the functional structures of the right, superior temporal lobe.
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However, because the metapersonal and extrapersonal forms of background awareness 
simultaneously work together, we must keep in mind exactly how they are different. For 
example, when driving over the speed limit a background, metapersonal concern of 
respect for the authority of the law can cause us to be anxious when we see a police car. 
Here, the responsive-evocative continuum of subjectivity is conditioned by metapersonal 
awareness as it is peripherally engaged by those common aspects of sensory information 
and linguistic structures which a person cannot identify with himself (e.g., the authority of 
the law that is represented in and by the police officer’s car). At the same time, the 
responsive-evocative continuum of subjectivity is conditioned by a extrapersonal 
awareness as it is peripherally engaged to sensory information and linguistic structures 
which have been qualified through personally conditioned memories and feelings of past 
encounters with the police car. Such engagement allows a person to change personally 
the emotional or memorial significance of aspects related to the situation (e.g., a person’s 
attitude toward how he is required to obey the law).
Through the study of patients with anosognosia (i.e., the inability to respond 
emotionally to the fact that one has a disease), it has come to be recognized that there is a 
significant asymmetry between the left and right somatosensory areas in the parietal lobes 
of the neocortex.30 When there is damage to their left somatosensory areas and the 
patients suffering from this damage are told that their condition is fatal, and that they will 
probably not live a normal life, they will quite normally respond with emotion and concern. 
However, if these same patients had damage in their right somatosensory areas, they 
would respond with an emotionless, unconcerned attitude. It is as though the patients lose
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contact with how the doctor’s words are personally relevant to their own condition. They 
can understand the words, but they cannot grasp how these words are subjectively related 
to themselves. Antonio R. Damasio (a neurologist) says that this phenomenon is most 
likely caused by the damage to the right hemisphere, because “the representation of 
extrapersonal space, as well as the processes of emotion, involve a right hemisphere 
dominance.”31 Indeed, some consider the functional structures of the right temporal lobe 
to be the locus of emotions and the source of our existential confidence. In fact, it has 
been found to be active in those having near-death experiences.32
However, according to the tri-relational view of the subject, it makes more sense 
to explain anosognosia by saying that it is the damage to the right somatosensory area that 
destroys the right parietal lobe’s embedded-holistic orientation which, in turn, makes it 
impossible for the right, superior temporal lobe to orient its extrapersonal, background 
awareness with an appropriately qualified corporeal intentionality. That is to say, we must 
specify how the metapersonally filtered and extrapersonally enhanced emotional 
intentionality of the right temporal lobe qualifies the corporeal intentionality of the right 
parietal lobe and how this corporeal intentionality grounds this extrapersonally qualified 
emotional intentionality in an embedded-holistic orientation.
As the corporeal and emotional intentionality move out from the responsive- 
evocative continuum of subjectivity, being qualified by abstract-structural and embedded- 
holistic orientations and the metapersonal and the extrapersonal, background forms of 
awareness, the frontal and prefrontal cortices can be thought to bring this awareness back 
to the continuum of subjectivity—but, now, qualified as a linguistic intentionality. Indeed,
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the functional structures of the limbic system and R-complex are known to be connected 
to the prefrontal cortex: . . the prefrontal cortex is involved in a three-way dialogue with
other parts of the nervous system: (1) via projective fibers to subcortical structures 
involved in arousal, orientation, and affect, (2) via associative fibers to other cortical areas 
involved in sensory, as well as motor, language, imaginal, and cognitive functions, and (3) 
via callosal fibers with prefrontal cortex in the other hemisphere.”33 Furthermore, we can 
add to this that the functional structures of the left frontal and prefrontal cortices seem to 
grant the responsive-evocative continuum of subjectivity as more interpretive function;34 
in fact, when there is damage to these areas, persons lose their ability to organize plans 
and overcome pre-established response tendencies.35 Moreover, the functional structures 
of the right frontal and prefrontal cortices have no such function. Although these 
structures are indirectly involved in the process of understanding and conceiving of 
language, they seem to operate more to translate propositions “into a scenario of being 
and acting.”36 Generally, the right frontal and prefrontal lobes seem to be active in 
helping subjects to orient themselves by “resisting distractions and developing an 
awareness of self and time.”37 One study found that the right hemisphere is more 
involved in self-monitoring tasks requiring only moderate reasoning.38
What is emerging here is the idea that as awareness moves from our background 
pre-reflexive and pre-interpretive dispositions, it begins to form an extrapersonal, 
pretentive-reflexive disposition through the functional structures of the right frontal and 
pre-frontal cortices and a metapersonal, attentive-interpretive disposition through the 
functional structures of the left frontal and prefrontal cortices. Consequently, these
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dispositions can be thought to qualify intellectually the evocation relation of the response- 
evocative continuum of corporeal-emotional intentionality with a linguistic intentionality. 
As a result, the responsive-evocative continuum can take on propositional attitudes (e.g., 
beliefs), acquire personality-character traits and participate in different roles that make-up 
one’s reflexive identity, e.g., a person may be a husband, a father, a police officer and a 
little league baseball coach.
The interaction between the attentive-interpretive and pretentive-reflexive 
dispositions and personally present awareness relies on the neurochemical communication 
among the orbital cortices, frontal and prefrontal cortices, the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortices, and the limbic system. These are the primary functional structures of neural 
networks that play the major role—although not the primary role of a linguistic 
community—in allowing the responsive-evocative continuum’s personally present, 
evaluative synthesis to partly determine its own focal patterns of reciprocal influence.
The cingulate gyrus is the outermost part of the limbic system, surrounding the 
corpus callosum (which is the largest fiber tracts of communication between the left and 
right hemispheres) and connecting with the parahippocampal gyrus in the temporal lobe.39 
The ventromedial prefrontal cortices run back from the neocortex to the anterior cingulate 
gyrus which is “known to be involved in the ability to think creatively and make 
decisions.”40 Thus understood, we can have a grasp of how the anterior cingulate gyrus 
serves as an evocative mediator for the attentive-interpretive and pretentive-reflexive 
dispositions. In fact, damage to the anterior cingulate gyrus, the prefrontal cortices and the 
ventromedial cortices “not only produces impairment in movement, emotion, and
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attentiveness, but also causes a virtual suspension of the animation of action and of 
thought process such that reason is no longer viable.”41
There is also evidence that the right side of the anterior cingulate gyrus is more 
active when a subject is in pain or emotionally involved,42 supporting the idea that the 
functional structure of right prefrontal cortex grants subjects their extrapersonal, 
pretentive-reflexive disposition. Moreover, there is support for the belief that the 
functional structures of the left prefrontal cortex grants subjects their metapersonal, 
attentive-interpretive disposition, for it has been discovered that the left side of the 
anterior cingulate gyrus is active when subjects are not reflexively aware of their need to 
maintain information to solve problems.43 In other words, the left hemisphere allows us 
to be involved in reasoning, but only that aspect of reasoning that is not reflexively self- 
aware. Together, these findings point to how the responsive-evocative continuum’s 
personally present awareness is evoked by two different, yet complementary dispositions, 
one a metapersonally projective awareness or identity and the other an extrapersonally 
reflexive awareness or identity.
While evaluative synthesis of personally present awareness relies upon the 
responsive-evocative continuum’s more creative and imaginative thoughts, these thoughts 
rely on the functional processes taking place in the anterior cingulate gyrus. There is 
evidence that its more firmly conditioned, sub-personal and pre-personal memories and 
feelings rely on the functional structure of the caudate nucleus of the R-complex. The 
caudate nucleus is considered to be the automatic transmission and filter station for the 
front part of the brain that plays a role in determining the manner in which thought is
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usually engaged with the world in our mundane activities.44 Moreover, it is the outermost 
part of the basal ganglia and it plays a key role in circulating dopamine, a type of 
“lubricant” that aids the communication of neurons and “seems to help us move seamlessly 
from one line of thought to another, or to convert our intentions to walk, sit down or 
reach for a cup of coffee into a smooth executive sequence of actions.”45 It is possible 
that the circulation of dopamine, among other neurochemicals such as serotonin, serves as 
an intermediary link between the nervous system and the supraorganic system as a whole. 
That is, these neurochemicals possibly constitute the material (non-intentional) substrate 
of the tri-relational subject’s corporeal, emotional and linguistic intentionality, which is 
temporally conditioned through a hierarchy of decision-making processes and by the 
present-personal, past-present-extrapersonal and fiiture-present-metapersonal dispositions 
of the neocortex.
We can now return to some of the ambiguities about why the right and left 
hemispheres have been found to be related to the phenomena which I mention earlier. For 
example, we can say that the right hemisphere is attuned to emotions, yet cannot be 
directly involved in initiating voluntary facial expressions, because it does not provide the 
functional structures which allow agents to interpret and re-interpret scenarios of 
extrapersonal engagement. Beyond this, we can also be clear about why it is that the right 
hemisphere is directly involved in the production of spontaneous laughter. By its 
functional structures, agents are spontaneously and extrapersonally engaged with their 
world through their extrapersonal, pretentive-reflexive disposition. Also, because the left 
hemisphere’s functional structures grant subjects a metapersonally projective, attentive-
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interpretive disposition, they can disengaged from their situation to create false memories 
from the pretentive-reflective evocations in the right hemisphere. However, the 
pretentive-reflexive disposition granted by the functional structures of the right hemisphere 
is not able to disengage from it immediate environment in this way, therefore, its 
extrapersonal (past-present) stance can only afford subjects the opportunity to tell the 
truth.
C. The Origin of Human Agency and Our Natural Vision of Truth
Assuming that a (healthy) human brain provides the structural hardware for how 
we have conceived of the tri-relational subject, against the background of its pre-reflexive 
and pre-interpretive dispositions, I will now discuss how these three subsisting relations 
allow humans originally to notice themselves, and then become personally present to 
themselves, as fallibly related to reality through their linguistic communication with other 
subjects. Furthermore, it will be argued that it is in this manner of discovering ourselves 
that allows us to become aware of a natural, teleological value of truth. In the pursuit of 
truth subjects are granted the capacity of self-control because they can purposively abide 
by making better judgements to live in a maimer that is more available to discovering truth 
and more responsive to intersubjective priorities. In other words, I will seek to articulate 
the manner in which humans become aware of their power to reason (understood as the 
power of context inclusion or exclusion), and as a consequence they can become aware of 
their power of self-control. Let us begin by differentiating “noticing” (or discovering) 
from the attentive-interpretive and pretentive-reflexive stances of the tri-relational self.
54
The metapersonal, attentive stance is a polymorphous phenomenon. We can see 
this in the way we use the verb “attending.” Unlike other verbs, it does not depend on 
what we are doing. We can attend to anything but we cannot walk, play or have pleasure 
with anything. But it is also significant that our attentive stance allows our awareness to 
center on that “of which we are actively engaged or busy or occupied in any perceptual 
(looking, listening, etc.), or intellectual (thinking, dreaming) ways. Hence we speak of 
concentrating or focusing or centering our attention, of not going off at a tangent. . .  we 
say our attention is given, paid, directed, fixed.”46 The attentive stance allows our 
awareness to move from ourselves towards some object, event or person on account of a 
particular reason or purpose. In this sense, the attentive stance is metapersonal because it 
always directs our awareness from a subject to something else. But if the attentive 
disposition takes our awareness away from ourselves, what is it that re-engages our 
awareness with ourselves?
The pretentive stance is also a polymorphous phenomenon. But it is quite different 
from the attentive stance because we are never actively involved in using the pretentive 
mode of our awareness. Rather, it is evocatively and spontaneously responsive to how the 
attentive-interpretive disposition focuses our awareness on the world, and it is also 
reflexively aroused as we focus the attentive-interpretive disposition of our awareness on 
questions, concerns and purposes. It characterizes the holistic, engaged predisposition that 
persons have to their present situation, or even to a particular object, event or person. 
Therefore, while it is through the attentive-interpretive stance that our awareness can be in 
focal contact with the world, it is through the pretentive-reflexive stance that our
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awareness is made focally relevant to ourselves.47 Furthermore, the pretentive stance is 
responsive to an indefinite number of cues that arise from the attentive stance. In this 
sense, the metapersonal characteristic of the attentive-interpretive stance is brought back 
to us as focally relevant mental states through the engaged, holistic, extrapersonal 
characteristics of the pretentive-reflexive stance.
The pretentive stance is also considered to be extrapersonal because it is not 
directly determined by us, although it is through past-present feelings and episodic 
memories that we are enabled to be meaningfully engaged with an environment, giving us 
a sense of expectancy while also inclining motivational attitudes so that we are persuaded 
to choose certain actions over others. Therefore, it can either take the form of an 
instigating or inhibitory force upon the subject, because its feelings and episodic memories 
can either be attracting or threatening. But in each case, it originates as a tacit response 
from an agent’s previous unconscious, conscious and subjectively self-aware engagement 
with an environment. Instead of paying or fixing pretention, it is already paid and fixed for 
us, making the world spontaneously relevant to us, according to the our focal concerns 
which are in contact with the world through the attentive-interpretive stance.
Although it, too, is a polymorphous phenomenon, “noticing,” unlike “attending,” is 
a mental action that cannot be intentionally utilized. That is to say, like the pretentive 
stance, it is a responsive-evocative phenomenon. However, unlike the pretentive stance, 
“noticing” does not occur concomitant with our intentional focusing of the attentive- 
interpretive stance. Instead, we as agents notice what is significant in the attentive- 
pretentive evocations, outside of what we were focally concerned with in the attentive-
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interpretive stance, by what is already significant to us in the motivational attitudes and 
personality-character traits of the responsive-evocative continuum, and the background 
extrapersonal, pre-reflexive and metapersonal, pre-interpretive dispositions. While one can 
be receptive to noticing particular phenomena, and even practice being more attentive and 
sensitive to noticing what one usually fails to notice, one cannot choose to notice. 
“Noticing,” as Alan R. White says, “is something that happens to us, provided we are 
properly prepared to receive i t . . .When we notice something, we are struck by it, it 
makes an impression or dawns on us.”48 Therefore, “noticing”—like all mental states— 
has something to do with our acquisition of knowledge. More specifically, it makes 
experience present to us without ourselves intending to bringing such experience into 
focus through the attentive-interpretive stance of the mind. In this sense, whereas the 
pretentive-reflexive stance is constantly relating a past-present evocations to a subject’s 
focused, metapersonal attention, an agent’s “noticing” is prior to all such metapersonal 
concerns and future-present visions.
An agent seems to notice according to priorities that supersede priorities in the 
projective visions of how we would like to be oriented in the world, and although our 
noticing does not manifest itself as a constant phenomenon, we consistently notice 
ourselves being reminded of what is most significant to us. As White remarks, “. . . it does 
not, unlike becoming conscious or aware, denote the beginning of a continuing state; 
‘become’, ‘remain’ , ‘cease to be’ cannot qualify our noticing as they qualify our 
consciousness and awareness.”49 However, when we notice something it is made present 
to us through the consistent evocation of what is significant in the background,
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extrapersonal and metapersonal dispositions. In a sense, it gives light (or access to further 
disclosure) to our attentive-interpretive stance towards the world so that we are enabled 
to make better judgments. In fact, “noticing” grants us access to experience the a priori, 
intersubjective value of truth.
I take the phenomenon of noticing to be a manifestation of the responsive- 
evocative continuum’s motivational attitudes, personality-character traits and personally 
present, evaluative synthesis, as it is responsively receptive to the attentive-pretentive 
evocation that arises out of the mind’s background, extrapersonal and metapersonal 
dispositions The intersubjective significance of the motivational attitudes and personality- 
character traits in the responsive-evocative continuum becomes evident when others 
assume we should have noticed something but failed, or when others are surprised that we 
did not notice something. For-example, if I fail to respond to a person’s cry for help, this 
person would think that I must be too insensitive to notice the needs of other persons. Or, 
if I notice that my wife needs help carrying heavy boxes, and take steps to help her, she 
may thank me for being conscientious. In sum, what we notice reveals our personality- 
character traits and intersubjective priorities to ourselves and to others.
However, we must not suppose that everything we notice has interpersonal 
relevance. For example, in seeking to confirm a theory about the nature of subatomic 
particles, a physicist may come to discover (a word with similar connotations as “notice”) 
how certain particles are related to each other. Although it is imaginable that one day such 
a finding might have intersubjective significance, such insight does not necessarily entail 
that there is such significance. Rather, my point is that all truth is discovered, disclosed or
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noticed, and that when we come to originally notice truth this is only possible because of 
the attentive-pretentive evocation that arises our of the pre-reflexive and pre-projective 
background dispositions as we interact with others in a linguistic community. Also, it must 
not be assume that something is true because it is something we have noticed. For 
example, someone might believe she notices an old friend across the room, but when she 
moves closer she may discover that this person is not really who she though it was.
At conclusion of Chapter 4 ,1 more fully discuss the nature in which our processes 
of evaluation are related to the narrative self, but for now I will seek to articulate the 
nature in which the interpretive and reflexive power of the continuum of subjectivity 
comes to be subjectively self-aware in toddlers, that is, how the responsive-evocative 
continuum of subjectivity comes to have a personally present, evaluative synthesis. This, I 
will argue, enables us to understand how it is that we originally come to have the power of 
self-control and how we become aware of ourselves as teleologically orientated towards 
the value of truth. I will begin by discussing why it is that reptiles and non-human 
mammals do not have such a standard.
As a general rule, the background and foreground attentive and pretentive stances 
of supraorganic systems are what determine the character by which their responsive- 
evocative continuum of subjectivity notices the world within which they dwell. It makes 
sense to say that reptiles only unconsciously or quasi-consciously notice the world with 
which they are engaged, for they neither have limbic systems, nor the attentive-pretentive 
evocation of the neocortex. Mammals, however, not only notice their world but can also 
notice the evocation of the attentive-pretentive stances to varying degrees (depending on
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the development of the neocortex). However, because other mammals lack sufficiently 
developed frontal and prefrontal cortices, unlike humans, they cannot be evaluatively 
engaged with their attentive-pretentive evocations, that is, with their thought.
Although some higher developed animals (chimpanzees, apes and dolphins) can ' 
reflexively hold information that is relevant to a task immediately at hand they do not have 
the hardware to orient reflexively themselves to other possible scenarios in the same way 
that human can. Such creature are unable, as one neuroscientist says, “. . .  to rehearse the 
possible consequences of different responses to a stimulus, without any faculty of planning 
. . . The animal brain is not checked to allow time for the choice of one among several 
possible responses . .. “50
The second of the two following examples demonstrates, I believe, the manner in 
which our reasoning capacity supersedes that of non-human mammals. (El) A toddler 
may attempt to get a cookie out of the cookie jar, an action he has perceived his older 
brother perform. He pulls a chair over to the counter, then climbs. When he goes to reach 
for the jar, he finds that he cannot reach the jar because his arms are too short. However, 
as the toddler is trying to complete his projective vision, he notices a taller chair in the 
living room. Therefore, he gives his attention to attaining to his desired goal with the 
higher chair. (E2) This same toddler is trying to get a cookie out of the same cookie jar, 
but now the jar is on top of a stove. When he climbs the chair to get a cookie, his older 
brother sees him and remembers that the stove has just recently been turned off. He 
proceeds to warn his younger brother not to reach for the jar, or else he will get burned. 
However, this toddler projectively takes a stance on what he has come to believe as true
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about his engagement with the world (i.e., that stove burners are only hot when they are 
glowing), and because none of the stove burners are glowing, he continues to reach for the 
cookie jar, despite having knowledge of his brother’s warning. Therefore, the toddler gets 
burned and notices himself to be ignorant in his evaluation of projective satisfaction 
conditions, which he thought would have enabled him to attain his projective vision. In 
other words, he would have normally avoided being burned rather than taking pleasure in 
eating the cookie.
In (El) the toddler’s responsive-evocative continuum of subjectivity is predisposed 
towards coherent engagement with the world to fulfill his desires, and in the process he is 
graced with an insight to his dilemma. However, it must not be thought that such an 
account demonstrates how humans are different from non-human mammals. It is 
conceivable that a primate could have been graced in the same manner. For example, an 
ape may notice a long stick to strike down bananas that are out of reach. In this sense, 
many mammals are capable of coming to notice a solution to a previous problem in 
fulfilling their desires. Therefore, the ape can be thought to be reflexively orientated to its 
environment, trying to achieve its desire for food, and then successively notices a solution 
(the long stick) to this problem.
(E2) is adapted from an example given by Charles Peirce to explain how it is that 
humans come to have an awareness of themselves. He says, “A child hears it said that the 
stove is hot. But it is not, he says . . .  but he touches and finds the testimony confirmed in 
a striking way. Thus, he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a self 
in which this ignorance can inhere. So testimony gives a first drawing to self­
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consciousness.”51 What this example attempts to demonstrate is that humans become 
self-aware through their communally shared linguistic capacity. Once a child begins to 
communicate with others through language, he will eventually come to recognise that he is 
fallible in what he believes, and this fallibility will characterize his manner of existing. As 
Anthony O’Hear explains, ‘The Peircian view then is that self-consciousness . . .  is initially 
consciousness of myself as a believer, which in turn depends on my being confronted with 
the exosomatically (linguistically) expressed belief of others, which stand in complex 
relations of harmony and discord to my own experience and ideas.”52 What I want to add 
to this account is a description of how self-awareness depends on the intellectual powers 
of the tri-relational subject. The key question is not that the child finds himself to be 
ignorant, but the manner in which ignorance actually inheres in the child.
As illustrated (El), the toddler has the ability to compare successively a earlier 
reflexive orientation to a latter reflexive orientation by noticing an insight of how better to 
achieve a projective vision. But in (E2), the toddler53 needs another linguistic creature to 
find himself (#1) simultaneously evaluating himself (#2) to be fallibly related to himself 
(#3), while also noticing himself (#1) to be related to the world in a potentially fallible 
manner. In other words, he finds himself (#1) as an evaluator of a future-present 
projective vision of how he thought he would like to be identified (or oriented) in the 
world (#2) to be fallibly related to a past-present reflexive identity (or engaged 
orientation) of how he thought he could attain this vision (#3), and in the process he 
simultaneously notices himself (#1) to be a personally present, evaluative synthesis (or 
judgment) between this future-present projective vision (#2) and past-present reflexive
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identity (#3). Therefore, because the relation between his past-present reflexive identity 
and future-present projective vision has been noticed to be fallible, he knows himself (#1), 
as an evaluator, to be related to the world in a potentially fallible manner.
In being fallibly related to the world, the toddler finds himself evaluating future- 
present projective visions he can accomplish in the world, through projective satisfaction 
conditions, with the knowledge of what once was a present satisfaction condition to a 
projective vision that seemed to be judged correctly (i.e., that the non-glowing stove 
burner was not hot). Not only has he gained knowledge of how to become more 
coherently engaged with his world in certain projective visions (e.g., those requiring the 
knowledge that some non-glowing stove burners are hot), he also has come to know of 
himself as a potentially fallible evaluator of present satisfaction conditions, which are the 
means to fulfilling projective visions. Stated differently, after the toddler spontaneously 
notices his fallibility, his continuum of subjectivity interiorises the intersubjective 
significance that he needs to pay better attention to the linguistically communicated advice 
given by other persons. For in interiorising correct advice he can have better control over 
himself, and become engaged with the world in a more coherent manner.
With knowledge of one’s fallibility, the character of human awareness undergoes a 
qualitative change. Before fallibility the tri-relational subject could voluntarily attend and 
re-interpret its focus upon the world and upon its past-present identity through the 
attentive-interpretive stance, and from time to time the subject’s continuum of subjectivity 
could notice novelty that would give it opportunity to resolve problems with its immediate 
engagement with an environment though the motivational strengthening of its past-present
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pretentive-reflexive identity and future-present projective vision. But after coming to 
notice its own fallibility, the tri-relational subject is now also forced to attend and re­
interpret carefully its focus upon the world and upon its past-present, reflexive identity 
through the attentive-interpretive stance _by the responsive-evocative continuum’s 
personally present awareness of its need to evaluate deliberately its present manner of 
potentially being related to the world in a fallible manner. The subject must now make 
judgments according to whether his thought will coherently adjust him to his world and to 
the thought of another subject. It is in this sense that we originally become concerned with 
the value of truth (i.e., truth understood as engaged, intellectual coherence with one’s 
world and with other subjects), and also with the expectation of how other subjects will 
accept, reject or ignore a manifestation of our present manner of existing.
Therefore, in originally becoming personally present to ourselves (in the three 
temporal senses of the word) as fallible, whenever we are put under pressure to evaluate 
how we are related to our world and to others, the responsive-evocative continuum’s 
personally present synthesis of a past-present, reflexive identity and future-present, 
projective vision find its evaluation to be in temporal abeyance between the possibility of 
truth or non-truth, that is, between a motivationally strengthened judgment, or deliberate 
desire, that can be coherently engaged with the world or other subjects, or one that 
cannot. From here on, subjects can pause to consider the manner in which they are 
evaluatively related to truth. And perhaps this is one of the reasons that children are the 
most inquisitive creatures alive. They, unlike most adults, tend to have no pretense to 
cover up their fallibility; rather, they ask questions when their personally present,
64
evaluative stance towards the world cannot synthesize their attentive-pretentive 
evocations so that they are coherently engaged with, or intellectually related to, the world. 
However, it is obviously true that once children become personally present to themselves 
as evaluators, they also become aware that they can rebel against linguistically 
communicated advice that disagrees with their desires.
In becoming aware of oneself as an evaluator who is potentially related to world in 
a fallible manner, a subject is aware of her ability of context inclusion (or exclusion), that 
is, to her ability to compare simultaneously (past-present, reflexive) subcontexts within a 
(future-present, projective) context, and do so with knowledge o f how this context is 
(presently) evaluated as its own point o f view within a intersubjective meta-context o f her 
awareness o f other points o f view. Basically, she finds herself as an individual with the 
power of reason, knowing herself to be in the temporal abeyance of a personally present, 
evaluative synthesis of her past-present, reflexive orientation among other possible 
reflexive orientations (i.e., extrapersonally reflexive subcontexts) according to her future- 
present, projective vision of how she would like to be oriented to the world (i.e., a 
metapersonally projective context). But she only knows herself to be an individual among 
other individuals who also make deliberate judgments as to what they believe to be 
beautiful, good and true (i.e., an intersubjective meta-context). Therefore, she can take 
time to evaluatively affirm (i.e., deliberately include) or refrain from affirming (i.e., 
deliberately exclude) her projective vision within an intersubjective meta-context and a 
reoriented, reflexive identity within her projective vision, judging how it will be received 
by others and how it will allow her to fulfill her long term interests and priorities.
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Context inclusion (or exclusion) best captures the phenomenon of human reason, I 
believe, because it explains the manner in which we can focus our attention on a context 
without losing our grasp on particular subcontexts, while we also can reflexively consider 
particular subcontexts without losing our grasp on the total context. As such we can 
understand our world from our concern with particular parts (or extrapersonal 
subcontexts) within a whole (or a metapersonal context), but we can only understand this 
whole because we originally find ourselves as a particular point of view among other 
points of view (an intersubjective meta-context). Therefore, the tri-relational view of 
human agency insists that human reason only arises out of our engagement with others in a 
linguistic community.
When we originally find ourselves to be fallible, we recognise our need for self- 
control in making good judgments according to the intersubjective nature of our 
awareness of a natural, teleological value for truth. The reason we naturally value truth is 
that it partly hides from us and partly draws us towards itself In other words, our 
intellectual concern for truth is transcendently related to the responsive-evocative 
continuum of motivational attitudes, personality-character traits and the personally 
present, evaluative synthesis in the sense that truth is not something we can intentionally 
disclose through our focused attention, for we can only make ourselves (in the three 
temporal senses of the word) available to truth so that we can better open ourselves (or 
predispose ourselves) to noticing it as a gift made present by other persons or experience 
itself. Therefore, we are required to take care in controlling ourselves so that we can 
become more coherently engaged with, and intellectually related to, the world.
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Our intellectual concern for truth is also immanently related to the responsive- 
evocative continuum of subjectivity through a pre-cognitive value for communal concern, 
which all mammals with limbic systems share to some degree. This communal concern 
engages us in our interaction with other persons whom we know also to be practically and 
intellectually concerned with truth. Moreover, in the process of interacting with others we 
come to interiorise truths of how to augment the way we communally relate with one 
another. Such truths come to be the intersubjective priorities that are evoked from 
background attentive-pretentive evocations, and there is reason to think these feelings and 
thoughts include our conscience. As a result, we find ourselves within an intersubjective 
meta-context which places us under the obligation to practice self-control by seeking to 
interiorise the past-present subcontexts of our reflexive identity with more practical know­
how, a practical know-how that can be made more or less inter subjectively sensitive 
through our evaluative inclusion (or exclusion) of the metapersonal, projective visions 
whereby we seek to become more coherently related to the intersubjective priorities that 
are evoked from background attentive-pretentive evocations.
The significance in this is that the object of our concern for intellectual coherence 
both stands within ourselves, so that we can relate with it enough to make better 
judgments, yet it also stands outside of ourselves, so that we must deliberately seek to 
respond to its lead in our day to day interaction with others and reality at large, or else we 
may lose touch with the light of truth. I will return to this point later, but for now I will 
discuss how this view of the human agency surpasses the denial of subjectivity and may 
even resolve problems in the philosophy of mind.
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Chapter Four
Conclusion: Mental Causation, the Narrative Self and Relationalism
A. Mental Causation and Temporal Unity
Among animals, only humans are aware and able to respond to the value of truth, 
for they are the only supraorganic systems which have a natural potential to acquire a 
teleological stance towards intellectual coherence, that is, toward a responsively and 
evocatively consistent relationship one maintains in the personally present, evaluative 
synthesis o f one’s projective intentions (whether bodily or linguistically expressed) 
towards reality and one’s reflexive inclusion, or exclusion, o f engagements with reality 
(whether pragmatically or intersubjectively received). Although our responsive-evocative 
continuum has a sub-personal (somatic) disposition towards survival and a pre-personal 
(emotional) disposition towards non-individuated, communal concern, we also have 
personal (rational) dispositions towards an intellectual concern for coherent engagement 
with reality. However, a consequence of this is that we are capable of attempting the 
impossible, that is, we can interiorise (and have intetiorised!!!) motivational dispositions 
which seek coherence within ourselves without concern for the intersubjective nature of 
our awareness of existence and truth. That is to say, as it is abundantly obvious in our 
contemporary society, we humans are capable of failing to use our intellect to become 
more conscientious, or careful, in what projective visions we seek to attain in our daily 
interaction with others.
Although we only become individuals through our interaction with others, we 
seem to have forgotten this truth. It is erroneously claimed that “a child’s earliest self-
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awareness is noncomparitive, it is usually preconscious.”1 It is true that we have a 
prelinguistic, somatic identity before we become subjectively self-aware, but, according to 
the tri-relational view of human agency, it makes no sense to collapse our awareness o f 
having the power o f self-control (through our deliberative, evaluative judgment) to our 
somatic identity. Instead, what should be brought to light is how it is possible to live 
according to interiorised intersubjective priorities that enable us to live more intimately in 
and with truth. Before recommending how we can seek to make ourselves more available 
to truth, I will first better explain how self-control and mental causation it is possible in the 
first place. Intervening these two topics I will show how the tri-relational view of the 
human agency surpasses Dennett’s, Parfit’s and Mellor’s denial of subjectivity.
Although I cannot delve into the subject of consciousness very deeply, I would like 
to articulate the what I believe mental states are like, as compared to that of physical 
states. Heat can be defined simply as energy in motion (i.e., what physicists call kinetic 
energy), but it may also take the form of a potentiality (i.e., what physicists call potential 
energy). All material particles, even those that merely vibrate, possess heat in relation to 
what these particles are moving against. Furthermore, heat can be transferred and 
dispersed; in fact, heat existing in the form of radiation does not even require a medium— 
it can be its own medium. For example, the earth is heated by the sun whose energy has an 
effect upon the earth though a vacuum (i.e., space). Therefore, I believe it is makes good 
ontological sense to draw an analogy between heat and consciousness. Let me explain.
In the way that the motion of heat becomes more intense as the kinetic energy of 
suborganic systems are concentrated in a specific location (in space), I propose that the
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information of consciousness becomes more intentional as the decision-making processes 
of supraorganic systems are concentrated in temporal unification. Such a comparison 
seems to have much promise, for our ordinary experience seems to tells us that as 
creatures become more subpersonal, having less awareness or control of decision-making 
processes, they also experience less sensation. For example, we tend to believe that insects 
experience less pain than fish or reptiles, and we also think that fish and reptiles experience 
less pain than mammals. Perhaps this also helps explain why humans seems to experience 
psychological anguish, even psychosomatic disorders, more than other mammals.
An analogy between heat and consciousness may also help us better to understand 
the three subsisting relations which make up the tri-relational subject. The attentive- 
interpretive stance towards the world and a person’s questions and metapersonal 
concerns, which deconstructs or constructs fixture-present projective visions through the 
subcontexts of our past-present reflexive identity by the sub-personal, pre-personal and 
personal decision-making processes, can be compared to the kinetic energy of radiation 
which passes from its source through its own medium towards another object in the 
world. In this sense, our attentive-interpretive stance passes through its own mental state 
towards the world to give us a focal awareness of the world. It is in direct, focal contact 
with the world through our questions and metapersonal concerns. However, this focal 
contact can always become developed intellectually as persons learn to be sensitive to the 
interiorised background, metapersonal awareness and abstract-structural dispositions from  
which our attentive stance is related to the world.
However, the focal awareness of the attentive-pretentive disposition can only
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become significant to us through the subsisting relation of our pretentive-reflexive 
disposition, which is spontaneously united with its focal counterpart. In other words, the 
pretentive-reflexive stance and the subcontexts of our past-present, reflexive identity gives 
their engaged disposition over to the attentive-interpretive stance and the contexts of our 
future-present, projective vision. The pretentive-reflexive stance is responsively related to 
the attentive-interpretive stance, which is capable of channeling its focus to the world and 
to a past-present, reflexive identity. Therefore, it seems reasonable that the pretentive- 
reflexive relation can be compared to the potential energy of heat. Like the potential 
energy in the pulled back string of an archer’s bow, the pretentive-reflexive disposition of 
the right hemisphere is always ready to be released when it is focally provoked by the 
attentive-interpretive disposition of the left hemisphere.
When it comes to the responsive-evocative continuum’s subjectively self-aware 
decision-making processes in the form of a personally present, evaluative synthesis, the 
comparison of consciousness to heat seems to break down, for heat energy (from the 
contemporary perspective of physics) does not move or withhold itself from moving for 
the purpose of completing a projective vision, while also being capable of abiding by a 
natural, teleological vision of truth. Or does this comparison really break down? I will 
later return to this question, but for now I will continue to discuss how the temporal 
unification of decision-making processes in the tri-relational subject may enable it to 
initiate and define its own attentive-pretentive evocations which result in the definition of 
its ow personally determined actions.
We can simply define the feedback mechanisms of supraorganic systems as
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internal, decision-making processes that have varying degrees to which they can focally 
concentrate the information they interiorise from their environment. Such systems not 
only acquire information, they also store it with other information and use it to initiate and 
control how they are related to their environment “on the basis of incoming and stored 
information.”2 From this perspective, we can consider some creatures to be pure 
stimulus-response systems. For example, a tick does not “acquire information that is fo r it. 
In order to be said to acquire information that was for it, the tick would have to be able to 
use the information it acquired; and it can’t do that.”3
Robert Kirk wants to stress that there are certain systems which make information 
“present” to themselves. Therefore, he argues that a system can only have perceptual 
information that is conscious when this information is “present” to it own decision-making 
processes. Furthermore, a system is only self-aware if it has a concept of a self that is 
“present” to itself. However, as Peter Carruthers points out, “. . . what is wholly unclear 
on Kirk’s account, is why it should necessarily feel like anything to be an organism with 
perceptual information present to its main decision-making processes.”4 Carruthers seeks 
to demonstrate how reflexive self-awareness may overcome Kirk’s failure to account for 
the intentional qualities of our experience. Basically, he argues, “. . . for there to be a feel 
to experience, the subject must . . .  be capable of thinking, reflexively, about its own acts 
of thinking.”5
In what I think is something of a synthesis of Kirk’s and Carruthers’s positions, I 
believe it makes more sense to say that information is made more “present” to a system to 
the degree that this system is capable of participating in making information focally
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relevant to its own present temporal unification. Animals make information focally 
relevant and significant through the attentive and pretentive stances, and there are varying 
degrees by which they can make that information focally relevant and significant to 
themselves. Understood in this way, animals experience more intense sensation and 
perception to the degree that they presently participate in fulfilling the manner in which 
they are teleologically engaged with the world. In other words, as systems become more 
metapersonally concerned with their world, information becomes more focally present to 
their own experience.
If this is true, we can say that to the degree that a system’s attentive-interpretive 
stance is capable of making information more focally relevant, the more the pretentive- 
reflexive states will refer, or engage, these focal states with past-present relevance, making 
its attentive-pretentive evocations more significant to itself. And such extrapersonal 
relevance only exists as a result of engaged unconscious, conscious and subjectively self- 
aware decision-making processes. As a result, the intentionality of mental states must be 
thought to be dependent upon the degree to which systems participate in realizing natural 
teleological dispositions.
This enables us to clarify how human agents can play a significant role in 
determining their thought (i.e., their attentive-pretentive evocations) and how these 
thoughts can be brought to initiate and express our behavior. For example, if a person 
arrived at work in the morning and is told that he has just been laid off, we can understand 
why his responses could vary according to his decision-making processes. Because he has 
a deep, unconscious somatic identity (through the functional structures of the R-complex
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and his corporeal intentionality) his initial response could very possibly be controlled more 
by his teleological orientation towards survival. He may, understandably, roar in anger at 
his boss from an unconscious threat to his very survival, somatically concerned as to 
whether he will be able to earn enough money to live. However, because his identity is 
also consciously related to his teleological disposition towards communal concern for 
others with whom he is emotionally intimate (through the functional structures of the 
limbic system and his emotional intentionality), we can think of him becoming more 
concerned for his family, worrying about how he is going to feed not only himself but also 
them. Finally, after a short time of emotional angst, because of his natural, teleological 
disposition towards truth (through the functional structures of the neocortex and his 
linguistic intentionality), he would eventually come to evaluate his situation, seeking to 
make the best judgment as to how he can now make a living, or he may purposively seek 
out a friend to talk with about his current plight. In other words, he can take time to 
consider how he is oriented to his values and the world, evaluatively organizing his 
thought so that he can get control of himself in relation to his values and the demand 
placed upon him by other persons involved in his current plight.
It hard to see how Donald Davidson, who leaves intentionality unaccounted for in 
his explanation of action, could use the above phenomena to justify his theory. What is 
crucial at each level of this person’s unconscious, conscious and subjectively self-aware 
decision-making processes is the fact that his mental states of feeling threatened, of feeling 
concerned, and of thinking through the problem assume that the intentionality of mental 
states play causal roles according to inherent teleological dispositions— not mere
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functional dispositions. And more importantly, it is not merely the intentionality of these 
states that cause behavior. Although the propositional attitudes of the mind (e.g., 
projective visions and beliefs) enable action, they do not—contrary to Davidson—cause 
an agent to act. Rather, it is the agent who purposively evaluates his situation according to 
the values he holds to be dear, giving some of these values priority over others, and these 
evaluations will define how he is behaviorally oriented in, and engaged with, the world. 
Therefore, it is the agent who is accountable for the decisions he makes to correct his 
engagement with the world.
Moreover, as the agent more intensely deliberates over his options and chooses to 
realize his goal through one route over others, he will experience greater dissatisfaction 
with himself if he fails to complete his intended projective vision. But this is not to rule- 
out the possibility that he will experience greater satisfaction with himself to the degree 
that his goal is fulfilled. Such, I believe, is the nature of a subject’s evaluative 
participation in making certain thought more focally concentrated than others in his 
evaluative, decision-making processes. In sum, the intentionality of mental states increase 
to the degree that a subject is involved in the temporal unification of his own thought.
B. The Subject of Self-Control and the Narrative Self
As we have already seen in Chapter 2, Daniel Dennett’s theory of agency seems to 
be founded on the same quagmire as Davidson’s theory of action. Dennett asserts that we 
must resist “the temptation to explain action as arising from the imperatives of an internal
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action-orderer who does too much of the specification work.”6 In its place he want to 
posit “thousands of word-making demons in temporary coalitions [that] could exhibit a 
unity, the unity of an evolving best-fit interpretation, that makes them appear as i f  they 
were the executive intentions of a Conceptualizes ”7
According to the tri-relational theory of human agency, there is not an entity made 
of a different substance within the human body who controls every action, but there are 
two—not “thousands”— interdependent “semi-intelligences” (the attentive-interpretive 
and pretentive-reflexive relations) that forms a personally present, evaluative synthesis, 
which is made present to the responsive-evocative continuum of motivational attitudes and 
personality-character traits. Together, these three subsisting relations have power over 
the temporal abeyance of the personally present, evaluative synthesis’s intellectual 
concern, enabling a subject to pause and give further consideration to its thought 
(although such pausing is held accountable to a natural teleological vision of truth).
Stated differently, the continuum of motivational attitudes, personality-character traits and 
personally present awareness controls the temporal abeyance of an evaluative synthesis, 
characterized by a fallible disposition towards coherent engagement, through the attentive- 
interpretive and pretentive-reflexive stances. A subject, understood as a continuum of 
subjectivity, controls its thought according to its future-present projective vision in a 
metapersonal, attentive-interpretive disposition, which enframes a subject’s past-present 
reflexive identity through a extrapersonal, pretentive-reflexive disposition. It is in this way, 
I propose, that the subjectively self-aware, tri-relational subject defines his actions as an 
executive “conceptualizer” with the power of self-control.
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One of the most fascinating things about the human mind is how it is in control of 
its own thought. While it is true that there are times that we do not have self-control over 
our mental states (e.g., as in dreaming while asleep), we normally possess the power to 
change our thoughts whenever we like, or at least we are able to pause for further 
consideration. In fact, if we perceive a human agent to be behaving irresponsibly we are 
accustomed to exclaim, “Will you control of yourself ?!?!”. Not only do people become 
protectively “carried away” with themselves, but they also can become reflexively 
“wrapped-up” in themselves. If we perceive that someone is introspectively (or 
reflexively) lost in his own thought, and staring off into space, we may ask, “What are you 
thinking about?”.
In the Theaetetus, Plato keenly described our capacity to control our thought. He 
compared it to a man who possess hundreds of wild birds in a cage: “In a sense we might 
say that he ‘has’ them all the time inasmuch as he possesses them [in a cage]. . .  But in 
another sense he ‘has’ none of them, though he has got control of them, now that he has 
made them captive in an enclosure of his own; he can take and have hold of them 
whenever he likes by catching any bird he chooses, and let them go again, and it is open to 
him to do that as often as he pleases.”8
Notice that there are three phenomena that stand out in this description: (1) there 
is the manner in which we have our thoughts available to us that is similar to the way the 
man possess the birds in the cage; (2) there is the manner in which we can take hold o f 
particular thoughts that resembles the way the man can grab certain birds rather than 
others; (3) and there is a manner in which we capable offreely letting thoughts go for
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other thoughts that closely imitates the way the man can let bird go “as often as he 
pleases.”
According to the tri-relational view of human agency we can account for our 
“caged,” or available, thought through the evocative nature of conscious thought, that is, 
the way in which our attentive-interpretive focus is given significance though the latent 
feelings and episodic memories in our pretentive-reflexive evocation. Although human 
consciousness may be evoked by the inward interpretive and reflexive modes more than 
non-human mammals, many mammals also have “caged” thought. However, when they 
notice attentive-pretentive evocations that are significant, arising from the background 
attentive-pretentive evocations of consciousness, for the most part they can only do so 
according to the way they are immediately engaged with their present environment, 
responding from their natural desires of survival and (non-individuated) communal 
concern. Whereas humans are capable of not only responding from these dispositions, but 
are also intellectually engaged with their own thought. In other words, they are capable of 
taking hold of their thought through their personally present, evaluative synthesis without 
being passionately or emotionally engaged by the significance in their attentive-pretentive 
evocations. Because they are aware of their own fallibility, they have trained themselves to 
pause before engaging themselves with their environment so that they can be become 
more coherently engaged with, our intellectually related to, their world.
To get a hold of our thoughts, our personally present, evaluative synthesis can 
create imaginative and evocative contexts from its subcontexts through the attentive- 
interpretive and pretentive-reflexive relations that enable us to be engaged with the
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meanings of our thought rather than the way we are immediate related to an environment. 
As Merleau-Ponty said, “Human life ‘understands’ not only a certain definite environment, 
but an infinite number of possible environments, and it understands itself because it is 
thrown into a world.”9 For example, when my attentive-interpretive disposition is focused 
on my car keys my pretentive-reflexive relation evokes innumerable related images, 
memories and ideas (e.g., the image of my car, the memory of when I bought the key 
chain, and the concept of how I use them to start my car). This evocation enables 
subcontexts to form around the percept of my keys, through which I can understand how 
the keys are related to me at this moment, and how they are related to a host of images, 
memories and ideas and projective visions. Perhaps I have wanted to buy a new keychain 
for quite some time; if I have no priorities that are more significant to me I could very well 
choose to satisfy this projective vision. What this means is that my present evaluation not 
only rests on my past-present, reflexive identity, but that it also always has access to other 
future-present, projective visions. But it even has access to more than this.
As was pointed out in the quotation from Merleau-Ponty, we only have a self 
because we are “thrown into a world” wherein there are persons who have their own 
points of view, their own beliefs about the beautiful, the good and the true. In other 
words, we are always present to and within an intersubjective meta-context where we find 
ourselves in the temporal abeyance of an evaluative synthesis that is projected towards a 
future-present projective context through the evaluative selection of past-present reflexive 
subcontexts, while our judgments are continually confronted with the possibility of being 
related to truth or non-truth. It is in this sense that an agent is always free to let particular
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thoughts go for other thoughts; that is, let thoughts go for what one believes to be more 
rational, or truth. For example, I may be on my way out the door to go get a new 
keychain, already having predetermined where I am going to get it, but on the way I may 
be reminded that I have a doctor’s appointment. Although the temporal abeyance here 
would not be very difficult to resolve, due to the fact the I care about my health more than 
a keychain, the important thing is that I am free to participate in what I believe to be the 
greater priority. In sum, I am free to participate in what I feel is most important in my 
present circumstances. And if I have awareness of something that is equally important, I 
am the agent who will have to make the judgment to choose one over the other.
As discussed in Chapter 2, Dennett, like Parfit, wants to compare ourselves to 
corporations or clubs, claiming that selves are “but artifacts of the social processes that 
create us, and, like other such artifacts . . . The only “momentum” that accrues to the 
trajectory of a self, or a club, is the stability imparted to it by the web of beliefs that 
constitute it, and when those beliefs lapse, it lapses, either permanently or temporarily.”10 
According to the tri-relational view of human agency, however, we must recognise how 
the “momentum” found in the “web of beliefs” that constitute persons are very different 
from those that constitute corporations or clubs. We can see this in the way we hold 
corporations responsible in a manner that is very different from the way we hold persons 
responsible. Indeed, the way that we hold a corporation responsible relies on the manner 
that we hold persons responsible.
For instance, if a corporation is caught using child labor in a third world country, 
we would not hold each person equally responsible. There would be persons who had no
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knowledge of the corporation’s use (e.g., outside investors), persons who had knowledge 
of the use but did not devise the means of using the labor (e.g., office personnel), and 
persons who actually originated the idea of using child labor as a means of achieving their 
projective visions (i.e., the executives). Although the executives may squabble over who 
was the chief instigator, the main “visionary”, we would hold each executive to be fully  
responsible for their actions. As for the office personnel, each would be held less 
accountable but each of them would be held guilty of neglecting their duty to refrain from 
participating in the practice and reveal it to the proper authorities. But we would not hold 
outside investors to be accountable for any wrong doing, for such persons would have had 
no knowledge of the practice.
Only the executives would be considered to be persons having frill “momentum” in 
forming their “web of beliefs” in relation to the unjust act of using child labor. In other 
words, persons who evaluatively included reflexive subcontexts, those facilitating the 
practice of child labor, within a projective context, or vision, of making more money 
would have intentionally neglected the way they were related to their intersubjective meta­
context and their own interiorised intersubjective priorities.
Derek Parfit is wrong, therefore, to say that humans are mere present relations, 
having no necessary relation to the future. I believe Parfit might be correct that identity 
merely consists of a chain of interlocking memories, but only if he, like Dennett, confuses 
personal identity with the narrative self. The problem is not that personal identity involved 
memories that are connected to each other, but how thought is made into memories that 
have personal significance. I propose that memories are personalized through a person’s
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evaluative synthesis of thought that arises from the background and foreground, attentive- 
interpretive and pretentive-reflexive stances. That is to say, we have personal memories 
because we are, by and large, in control of ourselves.
As the responsive-evocative continuum o f motivational attitudes and personality- 
character traits that makes thought present in the temporal abeyance o f an evaluative 
synthesis, human subjects are in control o f how they evaluatively synthesizes the 
extrapersonal, past-present relation o f their existence into the metapersonal, future- 
present relation o f their existence. Also, because human subjects always finds themselves 
in an intersubjective meta-context where they are aware that other persons have different 
points of view, they will be evaluatively concerned—the extent to which will depend upon 
their motivational attitudes and personality-character traits—about how their action will 
effect others; therefore, they will always be concerned about their future. As MacIntyre 
writes, “There is no present which is not informed by some image of some future and an 
image of the future which always presents itself in the from of a telos—or of a variety of 
ends or goals—towards which we are either moving or failing to move in the present.”11
I will return to the topic of how we can maintain narrative unity in our narrative 
selves in the next section, but for now I want to stress how a subject’s personally present, 
evaluative synthesis is not stagnant, but lived through a narrative self. That is, the 
personally present, evaluative awareness is related to the world and itself as the inclusion 
of the subcontexts of personal engagement with the world (in its past-present reflexive 
identity) within the context of a metapersonal concern (one of its future-present projective 
visions), according to how it is related to its meta-context of intersubjectivity. Because of
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the intersubjective meta-context, subjects are continually projected into a future to take a 
stance on the world, but the exact manner in which subjects will express themselves 
cannot be pinned down to behavioristic laws.
The reason we must investigate the nature in which subjectivity is related to its 
thought as a lived narrative before investigating how the narrative self can be maintained 
as a narrative unity is because knowledge of the latter depends on the former. To a certain 
extent, this is even true of our disinterested evaluation. Even our attempt to have unity 
between our thoughts about causal processes in the world and the causal processes 
themselves depends on our being lived subjects with a history. In fact, for us even to see 
time as a succession is dependent upon our evaluating time as a simultaneous 
phenomenon, indeed, as a lived subject. As Merleau-Ponty said, “We must understand 
time as the subject and the subject as time . . . this primordial temporality is not a 
juxtaposition of external events, since it is the power which holds them together while 
keeping them apart.”12 By investigating this, we will also see why Hugh Mellor is wrong 
to make the time series of physics (earlier-simultaneous-later) more primary than the lived 
time (past-present-future) of the subject.
Before toddlers discover their manner of existing as fallible creatures who desire 
truth, they have a somatic and emotional awareness of how they are related to things in 
the world. As infants, they live and interact with the world, becoming responsive to the 
information of their sensory functions and aware of a pre-personal existence which is 
evoked within them by their emotions as they become engaged with the facial expressions 
of loving (or non-loving) parents. But somewhere around two years of age they begin to
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acquire a sense of self. It has been found that when an infant is eighteen months old it can 
begin to understand the meaning of “now”, but by the time children reach three years of 
age they begin to understand the meanings of ‘not today’, ‘tomorrow’, and ‘yesterday’.13 
Such temporal attributions can be understood only after they have self-awareness of their 
fallibility, for this is the only way they begin metapersonally to find themse/v&s linked to 
the subcontexts of their extrapersonal engagement within an intersubjective meta-context. 
As they continue to develop, there “is a progression from egocentric causality to 
spatialization of causality . . ”14 In other words, they begin to attribute their own effective 
power of self-efficacy to objects in the world through an evaluative synthesis of their 
attentive-pretentive evocations.
When we make judgments about how successive events are causally related to 
each other we can only do so metapersonally by attending to how we are related 
extrapersonally to these events according to an intersubjective meta-context, and by 
evaluating how these events are correlated with other durational events. All of this 
presupposes that we are personally present to our own durational existence as subjects 
who evaluatively control our attentive-pretentive evocation in the temporal abeyance 
between truth and non-truth. Therefore, the concept of causality is the consequence of 
our originally finding ourselves as a durational unity with the power of self-control. In 
sum, our concept of causality depends on our concept of time as a succession of 
durationally distinct events, and this concept of succession depends on our being 
subjectively self-aware of our own durational existence. As a consequence, Mellor would 
do well to understand the time series of physics as dependent upon our lived time. In fact,
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he would also do well to reconsider his position on the non-existence of “tensed facts,” for 
without being a present, durational unity of a past-present reflexive identity and future- 
present visions we could not specify how human subjects able to refer to particulars.
According to the tri-relational view of human agency, we can understand how all 
particulars only attain their individuality and unity as they are re-identified by a subject’s 
personally present, evaluative synthesis, which is durationally situated between the 
subcontexts of its past-present reflexive identity and the contexts of its future-present 
projective visions, that is aware of itself having a particular point of view among other 
points of view through an intersubjective meta-context. In the same way that I can specify 
that I am here because I am situated in an spatial environment, I can also specify that a 
particular event happened at a certain time because I am, in my very nature, situated 
temporally, that is, this event is interiorised as an extrapersonal subcontext within my past- 
present identity, and it can be re-collected when I attend to the metapersonal context 
within a former future-present vision that made this event focally present to myself. As the 
attentive-pretentive evocations that were present when this event happened are re­
collected by a subject’s personally present, evaluative synthesis, this event can be re­
identified as it was originally experienced.
For Mellor, it is only true that I am now writing this sentence because it is 
simultaneous with this event (i.e., writing a sentence). However, according to the tri- 
relational view of human agency, I can only identify that I am now writing this sentence 
because I am an agent who is personally present to the evaluative process of completing a 
future-present projective vision through extrapersonal subcontexts of my past-present
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reflexive identity, according to what I believe to be the truth of the matter about 
particulars within the meta-context of other points of view (particularly Mellor’s). Such a 
view accounts for how human awareness of particulars rely on the nature of human 
subjectivity as a “tensed fact.” As argued throughout this Chapter, the human subject is a 
“tensed fact” because the human subject is a lived fact that can participate in defining its 
own existence; more importantly, it is an intersubjectively lived fact, for as we shall now 
see our only hope to live in narrative unity with ourselves (in the three temporal senses of 
the word) is by living in unity with others.
C. Relationalism and Narrative Unity
The externalist/internalist debate can be quite confusing. For example, in Chapter 2 
I described Hugh Mellor as an internalist because of his presupposition of the mind’s 
capacity of “insight,” which he believes enables us to recognise “correctly” a particular, 
primary experience but only through a particular, secondary experience. In other words, 
he thinks that the meanings of our experiences are provided by the internal workings of 
our mind. I still hold to my characterization, for reasons that will become manifest, but it 
must be recognized that some would call him an externalist because he is uncritical about 
the manner in which his mind “represents” the world. He seems to be satisfied with the 
fact that he can only know the world through his “secondary experiences.” Arthur Danto 
defines such a position as externalist to its core; he writes, “The externalist perceives us as 
in a world that rains stimuli on us. The internalist finds the very existence of what the 
externalist takes for granted the deepest problem there is, namely whether there is a world
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external to ourselves to whose existence our beliefs can testify.”15 Understood in this 
light, perhaps we need better to define the debate itself before moving onward, seeking for 
a possible resolution.
For starters, I think we should dispense with the idea of there being some 
mysterious division between the “internal” and the “external.” It is not that these 
metaphors are utterly inappropriate, but that we can better define the “internal” as 
particular, information processing systems and the “external” as providing information for 
these systems to process. In reframing the debate in these terms we can come to 
understand what is really at issue: the question is not whether the information (or 
meaning) is utterly “out in the world,” as opposed to being utterly “within the mind”; 
rather, the important question is concerned with meaning as it inheres in the engaged 
relation a particular, supraorganic system maintains as it dwells within its environment. 
Thus, I will choose to use the term “relationalism” over that of “extemalism” or 
“intemalism.” Accordingly, I will seek to articulate the objective manner in which a 
subjectively self-aware, supraorganic system is meaningfully related with its environment.
Throughout this paper I have defended the view that subjectively self-aware, 
supraorganic systems are structured by three subsisting relations, and more importantly 
that the tri-relational subject is teleologically predisposed to interact with its environment 
in a specific way. Therefore, we can answer the concern of relationalism by saying that 
the tri-relational subject is meaningfully related to an environment because it is 
intersubjectively aware of a teleological disposition towards truth—and this is what 
defines the manner in which the tri-relational subject is primarily engaged with the world.
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As opposed to Mellor, who is comfortable in his separation from what he would consider 
primary experience (and even admits that he can never know what this would be), 
according to the tri-relational view of human agency the intersubjective nature of our 
awareness of the truth is primary experience. But what is truth? It is this to question that I 
hope to provide an answer.
While our primary experiences are both local and contextualized, all our 
experience is judged according to the intersubjective nature in which our knowledge is 
localized and contextualized by the natural subsisting relations of the tri-relational subject 
as it is engaged with its environment. Furthermore, subjects are only meaningfully related 
to an environment through the attentive-interpretive and pretentive-reflexive dispositions 
of the mind and the characteristics of the responsive-evocative continuum of subjectivity. 
But we can also say that a human subject is only related to an environment at all because, 
as a personally present, evaluative synthesis, it is projected towards a metapersonal, 
projective vision (i.e., the personally expressive context), while constantly being oriented 
and re-oriented through an extrapersonal, reflexive identity (i.e., personal subcontexts), in 
the process of confronting and being with other points of view (i.e., an intersubjective 
meta-context).
Therefore, we can say there are three senses—although I will postpone the third 
sense until later—in which we can speak of truth from the perspective of the tri-relational 
subject. First, we can speak of truth from a subject’s extrapersonal (past-present), 
emotional and practical engagement with the world. Consequently, the pretentive- 
reflexive disposition can be understood as concerning its personally present, evaluative
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synthesis with the manner in which it is feelingly and practically oriented and focally 
engaged with the world, e.g., the way in which it can better cope with others in the 
different sub-contexts of its life. But we can also speak of truth from a subject’s 
metapersonal (future-present), projective visions of the way it desires to be ideally 
oriented in the world. Accordingly, the attentive-interpretive disposition can be 
understood as concerning its personally present, evaluative synthesis with the manner in 
which its projective visions, or contexts, coherently abide by what its continuum of 
subjectivity has noticed and believes to be true of its intersubjective meta-context, as 
priorities are evoked from background, attentive-pretentive evocations.
In this sense, the degree to which we will be coherently, or consistently, related to 
our practical and intersubjective priorities depends upon the degree that we have oriented 
ourselves in and toward the world. Therefore, as it was defined earlier—and while keeping 
in mind that we are postponing the third sense of truth—we can define truth as the 
responsively cmd evocatively consistent relationship one maintains in the evaluative 
synthesis o f one’s projective intentions towards reality(whether bodily or linguistically 
expressed) and one's reflexive inclusion, or exclusion, o f engagements with reality 
(whether pragmatically or intersubjectively received). Therefore, truth is a coherently 
maintained balance of one’s intellectual engagement in and towards reality. For example, if 
a person primarily understands himself to be engaged in the world as a farmer, he will not 
only aspire towards the projective ideal of being the best farmer, but he also will open 
himself reflexively to correct, or exclude, poor farming habits and enhance, or include, 
those habits which help him fulfill his ideal. According to this theory of truth, a truly
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excellent farmer will never think that he can attain the ideal of farming; rather, farming is a 
practice which stands as an objective ideal in which he participates.
Obviously there is a major problem with this theory of truth, although it is in one 
sense a marvelous problem. In sum, this theory of truth is relativistic. Because we all do 
not aspire to the same ideal, we do not all have the same understanding of truth. Some of 
us aspire to be great teachers, while others seek to be the best lawyers. Some of us find 
fulfillment as we compete in particular sports, while others have joy in painting. Although 
truth defined by the our aspirations to participate in ideals of personal interest does not 
give us an adequate explanation of how we all share the same form of life, it does allow 
for the value of personal expression.
This is why it is a marvelous problem, for it allows for an enormous amount of 
differentiation. We do not have to conform to one form of expression. We are free to live 
by our own interests. However, it must be recognised that differentiation in and of itself 
causes huge problems in modem societies around the world: The fragmentation of interest 
groups from one another and alienation persons from each other. Although differentiation 
unifies us in the sense that it assures us that we have own rights and privileges, it creates 
disunity in the sense that it destroys any communal vision of the good life in which we all 
can participate.
But perhaps the vision of a universally shared form of life is a fantasy. Perhaps we 
should not even attempt to reach a definition of truth which seeks to encompass our 
intersubjective engagement with one another. As a matter of fact, why can’t we just settle 
for a definition of tmth that is limited to the empirical discoveries of science? This would
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radically change our definition, for science attempts to view the world from an objective 
stance that deals with things that are as certain as the causal relations between suborganic 
and organic systems. It does not deal with things that are as uncertain as the values found 
in different practices and the joys found different experiences. Science deals with facts, not 
values and the qualities of personal experiences. I do not believe that truth in its frill sense 
can be defined through the findings of empirical data alone; however, if the tri-relation 
view of human agency is true, it should be able to account for why this is not possible.
From the tri-relational view of the human agency and the earlier definition of truth, 
science is a particular form of life, another way in which humans can be engaged in and 
towards the world. In the practice of scientific investigation, scientists evaluate truth 
according to their extrapersonal engagement with objects, seeking to interiorise the facts 
of the experimental information in the subcontext of their extrapersonal, reflexive identity. 
But these facts are evaluated and synthesized by scientists as they seek to verify, or justify, 
their theoretical visions of how they believe such instances are generally related through 
their metapersonal, projective contexts, that is, the theories of how they believe certain 
phenomena to be causally related to other phenomena.
But there is also something else, is there not? For what a scientist believes will 
largely be influenced by a deeper commitment to a tradition o f practices that make him 
aware o f empirical truth, the practices that enable empirical confirmation. For example, 
if a scientist believes that he has confirmed his theory by showing how it predicts the way 
in which physical processes are actually related to one another, then he may very well have 
discovered an empirical truth. Yet, this scientist must evaluate the manner in which his
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experiment actually confirms his theory within the present, intersubjective meta-context of 
the tradition of empirical research. As the chemist and philosopher, Michael Polanyi, says, 
“Science is a system of beliefs to which we are committed. Such a system cannot be 
accounted for either from experience as seen within a different system, or by reason 
without any experience . . it is a system of beliefs to which we are committed and which 
cannot be represented in non-committal terms.”16
As a result, our objective knowledge of the world is limited by the nature of what 
we are interacting with and the degree that we can articulate our tacit, extrapersonal 
dispositions within already shared beliefs. Therefore, objectivity in science is a matter of 
public achievement rather than pure fact, for objectivity depends on the faithfulness of an 
agent’s commitment to dwelling integratively in practices which allow him to be engaging 
the world in way that reveals scientific truth, while he also linguistically participates with 
other scientists to clarify these engagements. But it also depends on what an agent is 
engaged with. As Polanyi says, “ . . .  indwelling is less deep when observing a star than 
when understanding men or works of art.”17 Therefore, it makes sense that scientists 
should not treat all objects as if they were the same type of things, mere objects in space. 
For example, any form of behaviorism that wants to assume that there are no subjective 
states, but only behavioral responses to an environment, is completely fallacious. In 
assuming this they end up treating humans as if they were something closer to reptiles. 
Basically, they want to leave out the “tensed fact” of lived subjects and measure them as 
if they were something closer to pure, stimulus-response systems
Scientists are agents who are committed to their own visions of reality and
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committed to practices which enable them to confirm their visions. However, because 
such vision are typically disengaged from the way they understand themselves to be 
meaningfully related in and towards reality, they cannot tell us how to live. Furthermore, 
who is to decide which aspect of the physical world will tell us how we ought to live? 
Because it is the most certain form of empirical knowledge we have, perhaps we should 
turn to physics. This, however, would not get us very far. There are many physicists who 
believe they can answer the big metaphysical questions of philosophy. For example, Paul 
Davis and Stephen Hawking are passionately searching for a mathematical explanation to 
everything—a Grand Unified Theory. One seemingly insurmountable problem they will 
have to overcome is the incompatibility of Relativity theory and Quantum theory, for the 
first requires continuity and a precise causal relation and the second manifests no 
continuity and does not seem to follow one causal law. In the end they can only be left 
with the beauty of their theory, not its empirical truth. As physicist David Lindley says, 
“Experiments to test fundamental physics now is something of impossibility, and what is 
deemed progress now is something very different from what Newton imaged . . . The 
mathematical neatness comes first, and the practical explanatory power comes second.”18 
As agents participating with the same aspects, levels or systems of reality they can 
seek to articulate—and possibly agree on—the explicit nature in which phenomena tested 
in experiments are consistently related to one another. But scientists can only do this 
under the shared, deeper commitment to the tradition of empirical research. Although 
empirical truth in itself does not tell us how we are meaningfully related to our primary 
experience, there is great intellectual value to be gained through scientists’ engagement
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with phenomena in experiments which can be finely tuned so that a particular way of 
thinking of reality can be proven to be more reliable than other way of thinking of reality. 
Furthermore, such practices can reveal more and more about the natural of the physical 
world to the degree that these scientists diligently integrate and articulate the manner in 
which the findings of their experimental engagements with phenomena are related to other 
empirical findings. But it can not define truth, for if scientist were to do this they would 
have to persuade us this their practices are the best way to be engaged with reality. 
Furthermore, although it can give us, or seek to give us, a mathematical vision of reality, it 
is difficult to understand how such a vision would address the way we should interact with 
one another in our intrinsic, intersubjective relations.
Just as we have extrapersonal subcontexts, metapersonal contexts and an 
interpersonal meta-context of thought about our engagement with the physical world, we 
also have three contexts of thought about our engagement with social environments. In 
general, persons have a personal history of their own past-present, extrapersonal 
experiences (i.e., sub-contexts of our potential emotional and practical dispositions which 
define our pretentive-reflexive stance) and their own future-present, metapersonal ideals 
(i.e., contexts of focal aspirations and goals which define attentive-interpretive stance).
But persons metapersonal ideals are conditioned by their deeper commitments to what 
they believe to be fundamentally and meaningfully true about reality and their place within 
it (i.e., an intersubjective meta-contexts of different opinions about what is beautiful, good 
and true). The intersubjective meta-context of personal existence takes the form of deep 
commitments and practices which place boundaries on our projective visions of how we
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desire to be oriented with our world, as found in the beliefs and practices of religious 
traditions, philosophical systems, political ideologies and the value-paradigms of different 
social-economic classes.
Although it is only within the light of our meta-contextual commitments that we 
form our personal, projective visions of life, I want to argue that this light only discloses 
truth to us to the degree that we are sensitive to the tacit and intersubjective nature of our 
awareness of our natural, teleological vision of truth. Such a vision is tacit because it 
partly involves of the fundamental priorities we consistently notice being evoked from the 
background, attentive-pretentive evocation in our day to day interactions with others. That 
is to say, it is only through a deeper, tacit history that we have our own autobiographical 
history. “In fact,” as Gadamer writes, “history does not belong to us, we belong to it.
Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we 
understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, the society and the state in which 
we live.”19
Because all persons have tacitly internalized intersubjective priorities, it seems that 
if subjects are to maintain unity in their narrative history they must maintain a responsive- 
evocative consistency in the extrapersonal dispositions they interiorise into their reflexive 
identities through their projective interaction with others, while also maintaining 
intersubjective consistency in their projective visions, according to what they believe to be 
fundamentally true and meaningful about their world and their place within it. Through 
their reflexive identities subjects can interiorise personally experienced subcontexts of 
relating with others, while through their projective identity they seek a personally live out
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contexts of how they desire to be related with others. However, the manner in which these 
two relations are united will depend upon persons’ evaluative commitment to synthesize 
their thought according to what they believe to be true and meaningful about their 
intersubjective meta-context, which defines their vision of the good life and manner in 
which subjects believe they are obligated to relate with others.
For example, if persons are inconsistent in the way they treat people in their day to 
day lives, acting kindly to a select few and rudely to everyone else, while allowing such 
behavior to become a part of their reflexive identity, it is difficult to understand how their 
conscience would give them rest. In other words, it is difficult to understand how the 
background attentive-pretentive evocations of intersubjective priorities that were 
established when they act kindly to a select few would not be evoked when they act rudely 
to everyone else. They would be repressing their tacit, intersubjective priorities even more 
then they already have been, while interiorising dispositions of self-interest. Furthermore, 
their reflexive identity would be interiorised with conflicting modes of extrapersonal 
engagement. As such, they would not have narrative unity.
It is also necessary for there to be consistency between our future-present, meta­
personal projective visions and the present, meta-context of what we take to be true of the 
world, other persons and ourselves. For instance, if a person sincerely believes, and even 
declares, that no corporation should have the right to dump toxic waste in the ground, and 
yet holds shares in a corporation that he knows does just this, it is hard to see how he 
could have narrative unity in his autobiographic history. Again, we would wonder about 
this person’s conscience. A person would only declare such a belief if he were consistently
100
evoked from background, intersubjective priorities which he could not ignore, and such 
evocations would help define the way his projective vision. Yet, in continuing to hold 
shares to such a corporation he would be denying the very meta-context of 
intersubjectively that was tacitly interiorised by our unconscious and pre-personal decision 
making processes.
But what, specifically, is this meta-context that interiorises the tacit, intersubjective 
priorities of human conscience? This returns us to my original hope of defining truth from 
a perspective that includes the way we are meaningfully related to one another. Perhaps if 
we can make this meta-context explicit, we can come to understand how reality includes a 
communal vision of the good life in which we all can participate. But to even attempt this 
we need to turn to the traditions of our meta-context, for according to the tri-relational 
view of human agency it irrational to assume that we could autonomously discover such 
an explicit explanation of our common meta-context.
According to the tri-relational view of human agency, if human subjects lose touch 
with the traditions, the macro-points of view in our intersubjective meta-context, that help 
them notice their tacit and natural teleological vision of truth, it will be more difficult to 
maintain the unity of a narrative self Such traditions allow for a comprehensive 
orientation by which subjects can have more meaningfully defined identities which give 
them direction when they experience intense states of being in temporal abeyance between 
the possibility of truth or non-truth. By participating in a meaningful, meta-contextual 
visions of life, subjects can be aided with a certain degree of passion to include certain 
intersubjective experience within their daily life (and thus their narrative history), and do
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so with a concern that is open to being instructed by teachings that shape their projective 
visions with a concern for the one, tacit meta-context. If persons fail to be connected to a 
tradition whereby their lives are challenge or affirmed to become more intersubjectively 
sensitive to other’s needs and concerns, it is very possible that such persons may lose 
touch with their fallibility, believing their own projective visions are sufficient unto 
themselves. Of course, there also is the danger that persons will believe themselves to be 
so fallible that they cannot even attempt to make their tacit vision of truth more explicit.
But, then again, there is the danger that some people will treat their traditions as if 
they were so infallible so as to prevent them from opening up to see how other traditions 
may truly encourage persons to become more intersubjectively insensitive. Also, such an 
attitude of infallibility may prevent them from seeing how the manner in which their 
tradition’s beliefs have been explicitly enhanced fails to make them sensitive to other 
persons’ needs and concerns. Such persons, I suggest, are unable to understand how 
traditions are a means of meaningfully disclosing a natural vision of truth by making it 
more explicit. Traditions not only give us a framework within which we can find meaning, 
they also open us up to questioning our fundamental priorities in the light—or against the 
darkness—found in other traditions. But this brings us to the thorny question of which 
tradition best articulates our tacit, natural vision of truth.
According to the tri-relational view of human agency, we only experience the 
world because we are fallibly related to it through our awareness of different points of 
view, and thus our primary experience encourages us to have an attitude of openness to 
learn from other traditions, allowing us to question our identification with a particular
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tradition, or allowing us to affirm our participation in a particular tradition. In other 
words, our stance towards traditions that are not own should be one of understanding or 
conversation, which Charles Taylor, following Gadamer, says aims at a “fusion of 
horizons, not escaping horizons. The ultimate result is always tied to someone’s point of 
view.”20 Yet, such conversation must be based on an honest attempt to understand other 
traditions. As Taylor says, “.. . the aim of the comparative exercise is to enable us to 
understand others undistortively, and hence to be able to see the good in their life, even 
while we also see that their good conflicts with ours.”21 In the comparative evaluation of 
traditions, we do not let go of our own history—we can’t for it already owns us—but we 
granted a tacit, natural vision of truth to evoke in us priorities which as of yet have not 
been made explicitly meaningful.
Therefore, we must steer clear of two putative forms of evaluation which make us 
give priority to an attitude of openness over that of intellectual coherence. The first form 
of putative evaluation allows for projective openness but does so at the cost of utterly 
sacrificing our commitment to a tradition without justification. This stance is displayed the 
in the beliefs of those who want to claim that all traditions are ultimately the same, and 
that the explicit contradictions among different traditions are inconsequential. As such, this 
putative form of evaluation allows us to be projectively open, but it is a form of projective 
openness which disengages us from our reflexive identities by eroding and diluting the 
truth claims of our traditions As such a person could not have narrative unity, for an 
attitude of understanding, or openness, alone cannot define one’s autobiographical 
narrative. Although, as Allan Bloom has said, “[ojpenness—and the relativism that makes
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it the only plausible stance in the various claims of truth and the various ways of life and 
kinds of human beings—is the greatest insight of our times,”22 such openness has dire 
consequences. Bloom argues throughout The Closing o f the American M ind that once we 
resign ourselves to ‘tolerance’ or ‘openness’ we risk the possibility of basing lives on 
falsities, illusions and even lies. In sum, openness based on the attitude of openness alone 
would be taking a stance on a metapersonal, projective disposition towards the world 
without maintaining a deeper, participatory commitment to a particular tradition which 
gives us an explicit perspective on the tacit, natural vision of truth. This being so, how 
would we ever expect to move more deeply into the light of truth?
However, we must also be weary of resigning our attitude of openness solely to 
our current extrapersonal, pragmatic disposition towards the world. That is to say, we 
must not think that we can find unity with each other by discovering a common, reflexive 
identity, or a way of practically coping with each other, without finding commonality in a 
explicitly shared aspects of a common, intersubjective meta-context. This position is the 
second form of putative evaluation, a stance that is as empty as the first. For example, it 
can be seen in Rorty’s pragmatism: ‘Tor pragmatists, the desire for objectivity is not the 
desire to escape the limitations of one’s community, but simply the desire for as much 
intersubjective agreement as possible, the desire to extend the reference o f ‘us’ as far as 
we can.”23
There are many problems with this approach, foremost of which is Rorty’s inability 
to define ‘us’ and his means of attaining ‘intersubjective agreement’. He can do neither 
because he sees a “gap between truth and justification not as something to be bridged by
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isolating a natural and transcultural sort of rationality which can be used to criticise certain 
cultures and praise others, but simply as the gap between the actual good and the possible 
better.”24 Not only does he refuse to recognise the possibility that humans may have 
natural commonalities, but his “actual good” and “possible better” are too vague to offer 
any means of convincing others of actual pragmatic “truth.” Why should a committed 
racist who believes that the world would possibly be a better place if certain races were 
exterminated be persuaded by Rorty’s vision of the “actual good?” And for that matter, 
what is Rorty’s ‘actual good’?25
In opposition to these two forms of putative evaluation, the tri-relational view of 
human agency enables us to understand how a subject can have substantial evaluative 
access to making the tacit, natural vision of truth more explicit through his participation in 
the practices of a particular tradition. He can be given direction through a projective 
openness to other traditions, while not losing sight of the fact that his own projective 
visions are always formed in the light of the tradition he believes is most true and 
meaningful. In sum, in learning to live with others by seeking to develop consistency in 
our past-present, reflexive identities, and by being carefully attentive to how the coherence 
of our future-present, projective vision matches up with what we know to be 
intersubjectively true in different traditions—and through continued growth in what our 
personally present, evaluative synthesis considers to be intersubjectively relevant— we can 
always be aware that our present understanding of the traditions with which we each are 
identified may have the power to make our natural vision of truth more explicit.
As stated earlier, truth is not something we can intentionally disclose; rather, it is
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noticed by us when it is revealed. It partly hides from our explicit characterizations, yet it 
is partly within us as well, and this one of the very reasons we desire truth. In having a 
natural desire to make our tacit, natural meta-context of truth, including the tacit priorities 
of intersubjective concerns, more explicit, we have a natural desire to move from our own 
fallibility to the attainment of greater communal unity with others. Therefore, whatever 
tradition we belong to we can speak from that tradition, seeking to articulate how our 
tradition may have answers to humanity’s condition of fallibility. We do not speak with 
the intention of demonstrating the superiority of one tradition over another, but to help us 
better abide by our fundamental, intersubjective priorities that we all consistently notice 
being evoked from our background attentive-pretentive dispositions. And we can only 
find what these consistent priorities are when we converse with one another from within 
our own traditions, seeking to move ever closer towards a fuller participation in an 
explicitly articulated natural, teleological vision of truth.
In light of this—and speaking from what I believe to be a light found in the 
Christian tradition in general—truth is not so much something to attain and be controlled 
as much as it is to be taken up in a participatory process, a process of seeking which 
requires us to be open to its intersubjective claims upon our lives. Truth is not something 
that we can make certain once and for all, although it is something independent of 
ourselves. Rather, it is a way of life, something that is participatorily known. As John 
records Jesus’ words in his gospel: “. . . those who do what is true come to the light, so 
that it may be clearly seen that their deeds have been done in God.”26 The nature of truth 
is something that is fundamentally practiced. Persons do not know themselves to be
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correctly adjusted to truth through an impersonal mechanism, or “insight,” of the 
brain/mind. Persons know themselves to be correctly adjusted to the truth as they 
consistently commit themselves to obeying the fundamental, intersubjective priorities that 
arise from background, attentive-pretentive evocations. As we obey these priorities, we 
are not only made more sensitive to other person’s concerns, but we are made more aware 
of an emerging, intersubjective, narrative unity of our past-present reflexive identity and 
our future-present projective vision. Furthermore, our personally present, evaluative 
synthesis becomes more intimately related to our common, intersubjective meta-context 
which can be made ever more explicit.
Having said this, perhaps we can now be enabled to understand a third sense of 
truth I earlier hoped to articulate. From the perspective of relationalism, where the primary 
experience of the tri-relational subject is understood to be the intersubjective nature of our 
awareness of truth, the correspondence theory of truth takes on a whole new meaning. 
Historically, correspondence theory has been unable to explain how our thoughts, or 
linguistic characterizations, are justifiably related to things in the world: How can we 
anchor our thoughts down to anything except with other thoughts? Although we can 
never get outside of ourselves to discover the actual corresponding truth of the matter 
which resides beyond of our own concepts, we have the omnipresent feeling that certain 
thoughts correspond to reality better than other ones, and also that some thoughts do not 
correspond at all. How can this “feeling” of correspondence be explained according to 
our primary experience?
When the tri-relational view of human agency is united with the tradition of
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Christian doctrine on the Trinity and the doctrine that we are created in the image of God 
(i.e., that we are created naturally to be like God) we can say that our “feelings” of 
correspondence, including our tacit vision of truth as our primary relation to reality, can be 
made explicit through God’s self-revelation in the Christian tradition, especially through 
the Biblical tradition which is upheld by Christians to be God’s primary means of self­
revelation. In fact, it can even be maintained that the tri-relational view of human agency, 
or something close to it, may provide a means of empirically verifying the manner in which 
humans are created in the image of God, and therefore, revealing the manner in which God 
is defined as three subsisting relations that are communally united as One. Beyond this, 
this extraordinary form of verificationism may provide a means to augment our quest in 
making humanity’s common, intersubjective vision of truth more explicit. Let me explain.
It can be maintained that as we seek to live in a responsively and evocatively 
consistent relationship that corresponds to the manner in which God’s extrapersonal, 
pretentive-reflexive stance (i.e., the Son of God) is participatorily engaged with God’s 
metapersonal, attentive-interpretive stance (i.e., the Father’s Holy Spirit), according to the 
responsive-evocative continuum’s subjectivity (i.e., God the Father), who controls his 
responses and evocation through a meta-context of truth which is determined by the 
focally temporal unification of God’s past-present, extrapersonal relation and God’s 
future-present, metapersonal relation as a personally present, narrative unity (i.e., the 
Logos). In other words, when we are reflectively and projectively participating in 
accordance with the intersubjective priorities that are evoked in our background, attentive- 
pretentive evocations, by both being open to them and applying them to our lives, we are,
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to a certain degree, participating in the Divine nature. However, when we act contrary to 
the intersubjective priorities evoked in background, attentive-pretentive evocations, we are 
excluded from participating in the Divine nature.
This understanding augments our quest to make our intersubjective, natural vision 
of truth more explicit because it narrows our search to the manner in which God has 
revealed his Divine nature to us through the incarnation of his Son, who not only is “the 
image of the invisible God,”27 but has came to us “to testify to the truth.”28 But before I 
conclude with an examination the manner in which the Triune God is our meta-context of 
truth, I first seek to dispel some misconceptions of God in Christian tradition, especially of 
Augustine’s which have dominated theological speculation from his time to this day.
All too often Augustine’s Neoplatonic sympathies compromised the Biblical 
portrait of God as a dynamic and impassioned, yet faithful, Person for a static, impassible 
and unchanging, simple substance—for ”if the trinity is one being, it is also one 
substance.”29 I do not have a quandary with Augustine’s belief that God is the Final 
Reality, or eternal substance, but his inability to explain the manner in which there can be a 
temporal creation in the first place. Of course, he never sought after a holistic account of 
creation; rather, his concern was exigetical. He sought for a way to interpret the creation 
account of Genesis in a coherent fashion apart from an examination of natural processes, 
and Neoplatonism was the primary source of his coherence.
He tells us that the creation of all things originally took place as a simultaneous, 
spiritual event within God’s Word: “ . . . there is one Word of God, through which all 
things were made (Jn 1:1-6), which is unchanging truth, in which all things are
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primordially and unchangingly together, not only things that are in the whole of this 
creation, but things that have been and will be.”30 Again, I do not have problem with his 
concern that truth be understood as unchanging in some sense, but what I question is his 
insistence that creation was brought into being as completely and utterly determined, 
including “ things that have been and will be.”
God’s timelessness is a recurrent theme in Augustine’s writings. In fact, he strays 
away from the Biblical tradition which describes eternity as an endless duration, not as a 
timeless enigma. In the Old Testament, eternity is not the opposite of temporality; on the 
contrary, it is an “everlasting” temporality of a certain kind, characterized by the duration 
of a certain way of life (God’s life) and the quality of certain kinds of covenants (God’s 
covenants).31 Such a view of eternity is also consistent with the New Testament. As John 
says in his Gospel, “And this is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, 
and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent.”32 Eternal life as depicted here can be experienced 
within this current life, within temporality. In other words, as believers increasingly turn 
away from their own lifestyles, characterized by temporal unity that lacks narrative unity, 
they can freely participate in a relationship with God’s everlasting temporality through the 
narrative unity of the Trinity.
Augustine felt obligated to protect his conception of God from any form of 
change, especially that of temporality; he writes, “. . . it is unthinkable that God should 
love someone temporally, as though with a new love that was not in him before, seeing 
that with him things past do not pass, and things future have already happened.”33 God 
might have a strange and distant way of relating with his creatures through his eternal,
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predestined plan of salvation history, but he himself remains ineffably veiled in his timeless 
habitation. Augustine felt the frustration of the resulting incoherence of his conception of 
God. Confessing his confusion to God, he says, “ it is rare to see and very hard to sustain 
the insight, Lord, of your eternity immutably making a mutable world, and in this sense 
being anterior.”34 How can God be forever at rest and yet move to create a changing 
world? This frustration was inherited from Plato’s Timaeus, where eternity is depicted as 
a static reality, and time is understood as “a moving image of eternity.”35
Augustine’s concepts of time, eternity, and God have had dire consequences 
throughout the history of Western theology and philosophy. Augustine’s understanding of 
predestination and divine immutability have carried Classical theism beyond the Middle 
Ages into our present age. These ideas, I believe, are among the most responsible for the 
irrelevancy of the Christian worldview throughout the modem age. We think of such 
doctrines as nonsensical, offensive, and awkwardly abstract. Nietzsche was among the 
first to understand how the Classical idea of God was becoming less and less of a cultural 
influence as history progressed. Without an adequate way of understanding God, he 
thought all Christian values, too, would gradually loss their significance. Not that all such 
values would have to be utterly discarded, but they would have to be reinterpreted into a 
naturalistic framework.
Although Augustine, held captive by his Neoplatonic tendencies, distorted the 
Biblical understanding of God as an active, purposive agent with desires and feelings, he 
did lay the ground to correct this misunderstanding in The Trinity. After an exhaustive 
examination of Scripture’s account of the three “persons” and their relations to each other,
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he began a complex phenomenological search into the nature of the human mind to 
discover the image of God. Thus, he made some insightful contributions to the theology of 
the Trinity: 1) he opened up the a new pathway to understand the trinity—through an 
image of the human mind; 2) he understood the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as one Being; 
3) and he emphasized the double procession of the Holy Spirit.
Unfortunately, at the end of his examination, Augustine threw up his hands and 
retreated back to his Neoplatonism, stating that temporal creatures cannot “comprehend 
how God’s foresight is the same as his memory and his understanding, and how he does 
not observe things by thinking of them one by one, but embraces everything that he knows 
in one eternal, unchanging, and inexpressible vision.”36 The supreme Trinity is unlike any 
other trinity, for it is outside time. In fact, he takes the economical trinity (God’s 
dispensation in salvation history) to be utterly unlike God’s immanent Trinity (the intrinsic, 
ontological foundation of God’s nature). The relations of the economic trinity are 
temporal relations; therefore, he argued, they distort the nature of God’s timelessness. As 
for the relations of the immanent Trinity, they remain forever outside of time, and thus 
they are empty verbiage. Because our understanding is bound within time, and because 
God’s true relations are timeless, the supreme Trinity will remain a mystery—that is, until 
we are resurrected from the dead into God’s timelessness, where he believes “there will 
be nothing for us to seek with the reasoning of the mind . . .”37
What Augustine, and most of the major theologians after him, except perhaps for 
the Cappadocians in the East, failed to take seriously in his quest to understand the 
immutability of God’s nature in the Biblical portrayal of the Trinity is the temporal
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significance of metaphors describing God’s “begetting,” “sending,” and “proceeding.”38 
From the perspective of the tri-relational view of human agency, presupposed to be that 
which is created in the image of God, we can say that God is the Final Reality who 
everlastingly attends metapersonally to otherness through the focal relation of His 
attentive-interpretive relation (i.e., the future-present, attentive-projective relation of the 
Holy Spirit), but God, being the only Reality there is, everlastingly begets a temporally 
focused, extrapersonal image of himself (the past-present, pretentive-reflexive relation of 
his Son). As Paul says, speaking of what I take to be God’s metapersonal relation, “. . . 
the Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God.”39 This would also explain why 
Paul speaks of Christ, who I believe everlastingly lives as God’s perfect extrapersonal 
relation, as “the firstborn of all creation; for in him all things in heaven and on earth . . . 
have been created through him and for him (my emphasis on “bom”).”40
This is the major point I want at present to discuss from the prespective of the 
Trinitarian view of God I am proposing, which I will call Tri-relational theism, or holism. 
This view enables us to understand how creation is related to God and God to creation. In 
other words, Tri-relational theism not only enables us to understand the everlasting, 
durational unity of God, it also allows us to articulate the mystery of theism’s distinction 
between God’s transcendence and immanence. We can say that creation is distinct from 
God’s past-present, pretentive-reflexive relation in that it comes into being through a 
projective vision that is not essential to the everlasting unity of God’s extrapersonal and 
metapersonal relations. While God’s extrapersonal relation exists as a focal, durational 
relation that is everlastingly begotten in God’s metapersonal relation, God’s metapersonal
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relation everlastingly proceeds, being brought into focus, by the Father who is 
everlastingly made personally present to himself as the narrative unity (the Logos) of his 
extrapersonally past-present relation everlastingly responding in the temporally future- 
present focused love (the selfless seeking out) of his metapersonal relation. All three 
subsisting relations are united as truth.41
Because God is a tri-relational subject— the original Tri-relational Subject—He is 
able creatively to posit a projective vision of how He would like to be related to otherness, 
but because He is the only reality He must bring otherness (e.g., suborganic, organic and 
supraorganic systems) into being through His temporally focused attentive-interpretive 
and pretentive-reflexive dispositions. It is for this reason that I earlier questioned whether 
it was true that my comparison of heat with the three subsisting relations of human 
consciousness utterly breaks down, just because our contemporary understanding of 
physics does not include the possibility that energy may be teleologically, rather than 
randomly, organized. In fact, if we are to carry the analogy to its conclusion, we must 
also say that space must not be understood as an impersonal plenum, or a passive 
container. Instead, we are led to the conclusion that universe only exists as a result the 
temporal unification of God’s attentive-pretentive evocations.
Furthermore, because God is everlastingly related to truth, he does not seek 
perfection from creation or through the process of creating. Rather, through his projective 
vision he seeks to bring the otherness He created into truth, into his narrative unity, and 
the experience of His delight is intensified as a result of having others take part in his 
narrative unity. Also, subjectively self-aware supraorganic systems are allowed freely to
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participate in truth through their own personal expressions, as they to experience the joy 
of being made personally present to God in his narrative unity. But, obviously, something 
must have happen to destroy our inclusion in his narrative unity.
This gets into theological matters that go far beyond the concerns of this paper. 
Therefore, while I cannot here go into why God took the risk of creating subjectively self- 
aware supraorganic systems who could create their own projective visions outside of 
God’s narrative unity, I do want to conclude by showing how this understanding of the 
Final Reality may make humanity’s common, intersubjective vision of truth more explicit.
Tri-relational holism allows us to understand why we must patiently endure the 
struggle of evaluatively adjusting our projective vision to our natural vision of truth while 
it only resides in tacit, background evocations. We are to do so in the hope that we will 
increasingly adjust our metapersonal context to coherently abide by the everlasting 
narrative unity as our foremost, projective vision. As Paul says, “. . . through the Spirit, 
by faith, we eagerly wait for the hope of righteousness.”42 While the prescriptive 
requirement of entering into narrative unity with the God “is written on [our] hearts, to 
which [our] own conscience also bears witness,” we seem to be helplessly trapped in our 
“conflicting thoughts” which “will accuse or perhaps excuse [us] on the day when . . God, 
through Jesus Christ, will judge the secret thoughts of all. ”43 Such conflicting thoughts 
can now be understood to be the result of being personally present to the tacitly 
internalized truth of our intersubjective meta-context, while at the same time being aware 
of our metapersonal relation which we fail to make appropriately fallible in our projective 
visions and to our extrapersonal relation which fails to be appropriately satisfied self-
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reflexively.
At present, there is a promise that our souls can be increasingly put into order as 
we seek to follow the example of God’s economic trinity revealed through the life of 
Christ, stretching through his incarnation, death and resurrection. It is promised that 
“everyone who does right has been bom of him.”44 As such we can live “as children of 
light [whose] fruit. . .  is found in all that is good and right and true.”45 But such a life is 
not easy for it means that we will have to often endure by practicing what we believe to be 
right, even when we know we will suffer for it.46 However, through such a life we can 
increasingly become participatorily integrated within God’s narrative unity at a deeper 
level as we seek to imitate his extrapersonal relation, revealed to us in the person of 
Christ, who was perfectly engaged with God’s metapersonal relation during his time on 
earth. But it must be recognised that we never possess our own righteousness. Rather, it is 
an everlasting gift from God in which we increasing dwell as we participate more frilly in 
the life of Christ, for Christ made it clear that no one “is good but God alone.”47 We must 
never think we will ever reach a state where we can declare ourselves good, but we can 
have the eternal joy of knowing God more intimately as we become more attuned to how 
his metapersonal relation is working in our lives. This can be seen in Paul’s prayer for the 
Colossians: “. . . be filled with the knowledge of God’s will in all spiritual wisdom and 
understanding, so that you may lead lives worthy of the Lord, as you bear fruit in every 
good work and as you grow in the knowledge of God.”48
If this new articulation of correspondence theory (from the perspective of 
relationalism) is true, we must never be thought to individually maintain our own narrative
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unity. Rather, if our autobiographical narrative is to have any unity it must be understood 
to be dependent upon our participating in the intersubjective priorities we come to notice 
in our day to day lives—and primarily dependent upon our participating in God’s narrative 
unity. If we only have narrative unity by participating in the truth, and if we only 
participate in the truth when the subsisting relations correspond to that of God’s narrative 
unity, we are held accountable to become ever more sensitive to the intersubjective 
priorities of our conscience. For even God the Father has chosen metapersonally to draw 
persons who exist outside of his narrative unity into this unity through his extrapersonal 
relation, “through the eternal Spirit [who] offered himself without blemish to God, 
purify[ing] our conscience from dead works to worship the living God!”49
Of course, it is not objectively certain that this understanding is the truth—for no 
tradition, or understanding of a tradition, can be the truth—but the tri-relational view of 
human agency may help all people to appreciate the beauty of the light of the truth within 
the Christian tradition, especially its emphasis on the nature of love. Is really possible to 
believe that will come to understand the Christian tradition as the best revelation our tacit, 
natural vision of truth? Can this vision be considered to reveal the good life in which all 
humans can participate? This, of course, will depend on the degree to which persons are 
attracted to the beauty and the truth of its claims. While it is true that we may never be 
completely certain of its claims to truth, we can experience its beauty in a life lived from, 
through, and toward the Christian ideal of love. As Augustine articulated, “True love then 
is that we should live justly by cleaving to the truth . . .  we observe it within ourselves, or 
rather above ourselves in truth itself. . . always enduring and never changing . . ”50
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